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At the time of its construction (1971-1985), the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway
was a highly scrutinized public works project, but the years after its construction have
remained largely unexplored. Research in the John C. Stennis Collection, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Development Authority
archives, and local newspapers, revealed that despite developers’ promise the waterway’s
economic impact failed to live up to expectations, while its environmental influence more
than exceeded them. Though rural southerners failed to benefit economically from the
waterway, they embraced the environmental changes forced upon the project by the
National Environmental Policy Act. Built as a promise of economic development, the
Tenn-Tom offers a model of how economics and environmental forces intersected within
the rural South. The waterway’s history as an economic and environmental force
demands a reconsideration of the role of public works projects in southern environmental
history.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the later decades of the twentieth century, the people of the South experienced
a change in their society as dramatic as the end of the Civil War. Changes occurring
within southern culture paralleled modifications to its physical landscape, which was
altered by the machinations of regional development. Earlier in the twentieth century,
countless individuals fled the economic stagnation of rural areas and flocked to the
region’s expanding cities, or left the South entirely for other areas of the country in
search of new economic opportunities. During the New South period, southern boosters,
like Henry Grady, struggled to repaint the South’s external visage by laboring to improve
its economic image. These men and women sought to make the region appear more
modern and developed in order to attract new investors and industry. To accomplish this
goal, they reshaped the region into a territory of low wages, improving infrastructure, and
passive government. Leadership in the New South became effective in dictating policy
and controlling the political pulse of its populace. What Southern leaders wanted then
and would want throughout the twentieth century was a vibrant and stimulated economic
environment that would personify Grady’s image of “diversified industry that meets the
complex need of this complex age.” Though Grady’s promises for the New South of the
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early 1900s were fulfilled only marginally during his lifetime, by the 1960s, 70s, and 80s
he would have recognized the fulfillment of many of his fundamental wishes. This
“Sunbelt South” was a fully industrialized and modernized New South.
Within the economically and politically transformative years of the Sunbelt
South, roughly 1955 to 1990, currents of change swept away the diehard staples of the
New South’s natural environment. The monoculture of King Cotton lost ground to
diversified crop systems where soybean fields, cow pastures, and timber plots gained
regional importance. The growth of southern cities and their suburbs taxed the region’s
water supply resulting in drastic loss of wetlands. Then, as the Sun Belt cities moved out
into former farmland areas, emphasis grew on harnessing the region’s water resources for
not only drinking but also for navigational purposes. The newest southern boosters
envisioned a water system linking isolated southern territories to an expanding national
network of navigable waterways. When these dreams were realized alterations to the
region’s aquatic resources shrunk natural wetlands, as more areas were drained to make
way for human occupation.
The resulting changes to the land did not only affect the natural world, but the
human one as well. Farm sizes increased while their labor demands diminished as
mechanization forced poor farmers to seek employment in other areas. Many southerners
turned toward the industrial and manufacturing sector for employment, but jobs within
the region were limited. In response, southern leadership widened the region’s doors to
new economic experiences and began growing the region’s infrastructure in order to
entice industries to relocate their factories into the South. One integral part of the South’s
new evolution was the development of its transportation network. Within this system,
2

waterways emerged to take their place alongside highways and railroads and became
another tool important for southern industrial expansion. Like the efforts of the TVA
during the early part of the century, developers targeted the many rivers, lakes, and
streams dotting the South, incorporating them as another ingredient in their recipe for
regional progress. Through Herculean efforts of pacification, the turbulent waters of the
territory’s aquatic resources became another form of capital for selling the South’s
improving image to the rest of the nation.1
During the formation of the Sunbelt South, one regional project stands above all
others in size, money, and importance and it chronicles not only changes in southern
culture and environment, but also changes within modern society during the 1970s and
1980s. This was the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. Built between 1971 and 1985 the
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway was an enormous $1.96 billion federal transportation
project providing a navigational link between the Gulf of Mexico and the mid-Atlantic
Region of the United States. Intended as an alternative to the Mississippi River,
waterway boosters promised it would offer shippers from the hinterland of America an
expedited and therefore cheaper route to the Gulf Coast and the port city of Mobile,
Alabama. By cutting a shipping canal through the geographical divide of the
Appalachian Mountains and connecting the geologically separate and distinct waters of
the Tennessee and the Tombigbee rivers, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers created a
234-mile-long man-made waterway through the economically depressed states of
Mississippi and Alabama. Over its length, the waterway required the construction of ten
locks, five dams, the flooding of 40,000 acres of woodland and the removal of over 300
1

“Tenn-Tom’s Role in Energy Crunch Emphasized,” Tenn-Tom Topics: Tennessee-Tombigbee
Waterway Development Authority, Vol. 2 No. 1, June, 1976, p. 7.
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million cubic yards of earth. It remains the largest public works project in U.S. history.
Surviving decades of litigation, funding debates, and the policy changes of numerous
presidents—Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan—the Tenn-Tom, as it is commonly
referred to by its supporters, remains a marvel of the spirit and ingenuity of the Army
Corp of Engineers and the southern politicians whose promise of the project as the
economic salvation of the region guaranteed its construction.
Yet sheer size and its changes to the natural environments of Mississippi and
Alabama are not the only things marking the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway as special.
This massive engineering marvel also holds the distinct privilege of being the first major
public works project built after the passage of the 1969 National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). The passing of NEPA and the rise of environmentalism across the nation
began questioning the project’s radical realignment of the landscape of Western Alabama
and Northeast Mississippi and called to question the unknown environmental
consequences of combining the waters of two separate and biologically distinct rivers. At
the same time, observers questioned the loss of both human and wildlife habitats, and the
digging of what many saw as an “unnatural” trench through the mountainous partition
between two river valleys. After NEPA, the Tenn-Tom polarized the nation into two
factions, those who saw it as a boon and those who saw it as boondoggle. These
adversaries warred in the nation’s newspapers, courts, and the halls of Congress altering
the very shape and character of the waterway by the time it opened in 1985. As historian
Jeffrey K. Stine explained, “The history of the waterway’s design and construction is thus
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not only a history of what engineers can do, but also of how environmental politics came
to influence what they may do.”2
From the first suggestion of its construction, the Tenn-Tom came under intense
scrutiny and criticism from a small, but emerging southern environmental movement, and
quickly became a national staging ground of contention between the environmental
concerns of the newly created NEPA mandates and the economically driven supporters of
large-scale public works projects. The battle over the Tenn-Tom highlighted the
difficulties environmentalism faced within the South as it clashed with the economic
promises of regional developers, who portrayed the waterway as the economic salvation
of their home states. Environmentalists found opposition from an economically and
politically powerful regional development group, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway
Development Authority (TTWDA), which enticed the impoverished local populations to
overlook the uncertainties of environmental damages for the greater promise of jobs and
industry. This development group gathered local populations to their side and hampered
the environmentalists’ cause keeping them from organizing a large enough response to
halt Tenn-Tom construction. The environmentalists’ efforts not only challenged the
waterway, but changed forever the way the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and national
politics handled construction of large-scale public works projects in the following years.3
One modus operandi of southern leadership was to look toward public funds as a
way of bringing in outside money into their traditionally poor states. Public works
projects like the Tenn-Tom brought the region a financial panacea in the form of federal
2

Jeffrey K. Stine, “The Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway and the Evolution of Cultural Resource
Management,” Public Historian Vol. 4 Issue 2 (1992): 3-8.
3
Ibid, Paul Sims, “1977: A Year the Canal Fought to Live,” The Banner Independent, Booneville,
Mississippi, March 30, 1978. p. 8.
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dollars. Many of these public works projects allocated funding for improving and
controlling the water resources of the nation, and a strong southern Congressional
coalition ensured their home states received their share of this public money. In their
wake, water projects left transformed environments where the local people grappled with
the day-to-day realities of their altered homelands. While conservationists argued in
favor of saving the diminishing assets of an unaltered natural world, regional developers
were more than willing to trade natural landscapes for gains in economic progress and the
poor populations of southern states placed their support behind the promise of more jobs,
not the plight of fish and wildlife. The language of regional developers embraced the
Tenn-Tom’s economic progress and spawned the rhetorical promise of economic
salvation based upon the successful construction and development of the TennesseeTombigbee Waterway.4
By definition, progress implies the development of an individual, society,
economy, or culture in a direction considered more beneficial than and superior to its
previous state. For proponents of the waterway, this meant the emergence of region’s
economic prominence through the industrialization of its economy. In the case of the
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, boosters idolized concepts of progress, creating a
controversial ideological gap between the South and the rest of the nation as individual
values differed from region to region. The problem of the Tenn-Tom’s promise to
outsiders stemmed not from the South’s hope of economic advancement, but rather the
price southerners were willing to pay in order to achieve it.

4

“Blanton Named Tenn-Tom Authority Chairman,” Tenn-Tom Topics: Tennessee-Tombigbee
Waterway Development Authority, Vol. 1 No. 3, November, 1975, p. 2.
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During the 1970s, national criticism rose to challenge construction of the TennTom because of its inflating construction costs, questionable cost/benefit ratio, and
harmful environmental ramifications. These factors combined to mar the waterway’s
reputation to many people outside its immediate area. As national interests changed at an
ever rapidly case and reflected growing unease around large-scale water resource
projects, southerners were reluctant to adjust their way of thinking especially when faced
by criticism from apparent outsiders. After decades of forced change from national
interests, such as in the case of its Civil Rights Movement, many southerners—especially
rural white southerners—harbored misgivings about external federal interference in their
daily lives. Local people saw criticism of the Tenn-Tom by national newspapers and
environmental groups as coming solely from outside the South and chalked their
disparaging remarks as regional competition in the former, or inconsequential in the latter
as the people of Alabama and Mississippi not environmentalists would be the ones living
with the aftereffects of the waterway in their everyday life. Yet, the poor economic
conditions within the project area placed tremendous strain on local populations, as they
lacked the finances needed to spur progress. Lagging behind the rest of the nation in
income and education levels, both key signs of national progress, the populations of
Mississippi and Alabama turned toward the local patronage of their political and business
leaders to act a their guides toward fulfilling the economic promise of the Tenn-Tom.
The populations of these two states remained largely unconcerned with changes in
national opinion, such as the development of a national environmental movement, and
focused solely on the promise of economics gains associated with the waterway.5
5

Nathaniel D. McClure, “A major project in the age of the environment: out of controversy,
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Yet, as the Sunbelt South and the Tenn-Tom developed during the 1960s, 1970s
and 1980s, the rise of the national environmental movement marked another period of
change. Fueled by the loss and degradation of natural landscapes—especially those
associated with large-scale public works projects—the tumultuous years of the 1960s
spawned the national environmental movement. Environmentalists’ sought a
reprioritization of how federal projects were judged. They looked at the detrimental
effects of federal projects on the natural world with equal consideration to the potential
benefits to the human one. These arguments placed them at odds with the economic
developments of the nation and the South. Despite the growth of some environmentalist
groups within the South, in particular Florida, environmentalism lacked appeal within an
unfavorable region solidly committed to the growth of its economic potential. The result
was a period of southern history where southern politicians, business leaders, and
populations struggled to assert their regional development ideologies within an arena of
growing national awareness in federal expenditures and their contributions to
environmentally insensitive projects. Because of the rise of environmentalism, southern
politicians and developers not only had to scheme of ways to receive federal funding
from a tightening federal budget, but they also had to contend with outside scrutiny of
their federal projects as environmentalist began taking federal projects to the courts.6
Despite the South’s seemingly lagging environmentalist impulses, during the
planning stage of the Tenn-Tom however, a local environmental movement did emerge,
complexity, and challenge,” Environmental Geology (1985) vol. 7, issue 1, p. 15-19.
6
For examples of other southern environmental groups see Albert E. Cowdrey, This Land, This
South: An Environmental History (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 181-182;
Walter A. Rosenbaum, “The Bureacracy and Environmental Policy,” in James P. Lester (ed.)
Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989) p.
212-237. For examples of court cases see
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anchored by academics, scientists, and environmental experts, rather than the more
common people tied directly to the land. Environmentalists’ objections and two lawsuits
failed to stop the construction of the waterway, however, because of overwhelming
support from industry and economic leaders, who promised the waterway would end
poverty and unemployment. Promoted as a vital component for future economic stimulus
in one of the poorest regions of the South, the Tenn-Tom spotlighted the transitioning
conflict between environmentalism and the economic development interests of the South,
a clash between the environment and economics. As Stine argued, “The history of the
Tenn-Tom provides a window into the changes occurring in the relationship between
environmental organizations and the federal government. It illustrates the maturation of
the environmental movement and its growing facility in coalition-building…the
importance of seemingly intangible societal values on such tangible things as public
works projects.”7
As Stine explained in his 1993 study of the construction, “the Tenn-Tom is the
story of a symbol—possibly a monument—to the end of one era and the beginning of
another.” His narrative explained the effects of the changing local and national political
climate during the years of the waterway’s construction, the development of grassroots
organizations to both help and hinder the waterway’s development, its controversial and
questionable economic justifications, and the role the environment (or more importantly
environmentalism) played in fighting to halt its construction. Stine argued the project
marked changes in not only Mississippi and Alabama, but also the nation as a whole.

7

See Samueal P. Hayes, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United
States, 1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Stine, Mixing the Waters, p 7, 10,
11.
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Technology and the environment clashed in one tumultuous episode in history and its
ramifications influenced how water transportation projects are handled to this day. Stine
declared, “Study of the politics and engineering design of the Tennessee-Tombigbee
Waterway reveals much about how the interplay between technology and the
environment was assessed, misunderstood, and reassessed in the United States during the
transitional decade of the 1970s.”8
While Stine’s work centered on the building of the Tenn-Tom, this thesis will
examine the years after the project’s construction. Exploration of the history of the
waterway after construction requires retracing of some of Stine’s footsteps. Instead of
focusing on the national outlook of the waterway, it looks at the project from a more
regional perspective. By studying the actions, words, hopes and dreams of local people
tied intimately to the waterway, one gets a deeper appreciation of its ramifications on the
region’s culture. A reevaluation of the Tenn-Tom’s origin begins with the building of its
promise. During the planning and construction phase of the Tenn-Tom, local commercial
interests adopted a rhetoric that developed into a kind of mantra of economic promise
when discussing the merits of the waterway.
Adding their voices to this growing chorus was a coalition of southern politicians,
who benefited from the seniority system of Congress and held positions of authority upon
key committees responsible for appropriations and funding. No society can allow
production to lag to such an extent that its existence is threatened. For many, to lag
meant to die and individuals never die willingly. Most remain ready to undergo any
sacrifice to overcome the difficulties which stand in the way of economic production and
8

Jeffrey K Sine, Mixing the Waters: Environment, Politics, and the Building of the TennesseeTombigbee Waterway (Akron, Ohio: The University of Akron Press, 1993), p. 2, 10.
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their existence. In the case of the Tenn-Tom, the environment and economic needs
determined the methods, forces, and means that individuals used to bring about the
region’s development, expansion of its production, and the cultural results which
followed. However, the necessity for the development and expansion of the waterway’s
economic production did not depend solely on the shoulders of faceless individuals, but
on the actions of community leaders, developers, and politicians, because they were often
best suited to the task they wished to attain.
Together, these forces created the Tenn-Tom’s promise, one so pervasive that
they left little room for a middle ground. The success or failure of the waterway placed
opponents at different ends of the political spectrum, guaranteeing that neither side could
hope for easy victory. To ensure the successful construction of the waterway, boosters
promised everything to the people of the South, but in the process made living up to these
expectations a gargantuan task.
During the mid-1980s and early 1990s, the years after completion of the
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, many believed the waterway failed to live up to
impossible promises built by the regions political and business leaders. Some argued that
therefore the Tenn-Tom was largely forgotten outside of Mississippi and Alabama.
Critics pointed at the lack of tonnage flowing down the Tenn-Tom—only six percent of
the predicted tonnage flowed through the waterway in 1985—as confirmation that it was
a boondoggle of tremendous proportions and one of the greatest misuses of federal
money in the history of the United States. With multimillion dollar locks filling with
civilian owned pleasure craft, instead of commercial shipping barges, challengers labeled
it “a nearly $2 billion fishing whole.” In the first ten years of operation—1985-1995—
11

individuals—both nationally and locally—failed to realize that there was no way to have
industry before the waterway was completed and most did not accept the premise that to
benefit from the Tenn-Tom economically, would take years of development and
maturation. Several factors added further difficulties for the regional development efforts
along the waterway, including an early opening date, changes in U.S. export market, and
an apparent lose of faith and rushed judgment by local communities striving to benefit
from waterway trade and commerce. This thesis will look into the different responses of
local communities within the Tenn-Tom area and show that the developers’ efforts during
the construction were just the initial ones needed in a long battle to reap economic
benefits. After the long years of construction, there was a natural letdown when it came
time to live with the reality of the Tenn-Tom and not just its promise. A closer
examination of the waterway shows that tonnage and dollars are not always the best
reflections for gauging the true worth of a project’s economic impact. From connecting
isolated rural communities to the wider world to offering people a plethora of recreational
activities, the waterway offered additional benefits to local populations. Figuring out the
real gains to the people of Mississippi and Alabama are difficult to substantiate and
require different outlooks than those expected with the Tenn-Tom’s coming. Through
the first ten years of operation the waterway’s economic promise endured, even as it
struggled for fulfillment, and remained a symbol of the region’s current and future
economic development.9

9

“A $2-Billion White Elephant,” St. Petersburg (FL) Times, February 23, 1986; “Toward the
Bottom of the Barrel,” Washington Post, June 9, 1985; “Conservationists Say Tenn-Tom Battle Not over
Yet,” Florence (AL) Times Daily, June 2, 1985; and David Tortorano, “Yachts Outnumber Industrial Ships
on New Tenn-Tom Waterway,” San Francisco Examiner, June 1, 1986.
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Despite poor showings in some of Tenn-Tom’s economic enterprises and its
inability to change the fiscal identity of the South, transformations to the natural
landscapes of Mississippi and Alabama, offer counter arguments and show that the TennTom prospered in one area that few foresaw. Benefiting from the environmental and
cultural resource measures set forth by the environmentalists and NEPA, recreational
activities along the waterway’s shores boomed from the very beginning. The TennTom’s environmental measures created a bonus to both its economics (though from the
unlikely source of recreational dollars) and the environment of the region (with the
creation and management of numerous wildlife management areas, beaches,
campgrounds, and impounded lakes). Thorough examination of the environmental tactics
employed during construction show that the Corps’ predicted “land enhancement,” while
an appalling thought to true environmentalists, was embraced by millions of nature lovers
visiting its waters and woods. The Corps took lands depleted through decades of abuse,
replanted them for diverse species habitats and marked them as wildlife management
areas. Not to say that all animals prospered from the creation of the waterway and its
subsequent changes to the land, but more often than not, wildlife gained new and
protected habitats. Despite the unnatural origins of its lakes and forest, Tenn-Tom
wildlife management areas saw wildlife habitats boom and saw to the reintroduction of
some endangered species back into their native habitats. At the same time that these
changed lands created new habitats and ecosystems, they also created scenic recreational
environments that drew millions of visitors to the waterway’s shores, generating new
cultural resources in place of those lost during construction. These visitors to the
region’s campgrounds, boat ramps, and environmental education centers brought
13

unexpected sources of economic stimulus into the region. Their recreational dollars
offered a salvation to the waterway’s promise by combining the Tenn-Tom’s
environment with its economics.
The one enduring legacy of the Tenn-Tom’s promise is that economics and
environment are not always at odds with each other. Through environmental
considerations, man and nature can form a reciprocal relationship. In the end, the TennTom became a project where economics and the environment did not always clash. In
fact, in the years after its opening, aspects of each enforced the goals of the other. The
Tennessee Tombigbee Waterway remains a symbol of not only the opening and closing
of an era, but on how to build, operate, and maintain a modern water navigational system
for the benefit of future generations and perhaps show how to lessen their harsh impacts
on cultural and natural landscapes.

14

CHAPTER II
THE BUILDING OF AN UNFULFILLABLE PROMISE: THE CONSTRUCTION OT
THE TENNESSEE-TOMBIGBEE WATERWAY

On May 25, 1971, President Richard Nixon attended the groundbreaking
ceremony celebrating the official start of construction on the Tennessee-Tombigbee
Waterway in Mobile, Alabama. Nixon’s appearance at the occasion marked his
commitment to a project deemed controversial to many outside the South. By allotting
$1 million for the waterway in the 1971 budget, Nixon increased prior funding and
facilitated a start to the project. Addressing the crowd at the ceremony, Nixon stated,
“After 160 years of trying to talk it [the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway] to death,
Congress finally acted. I want you to know that it was to the credit of both parties and
several administrations that this project finally begins.” After years of work and debate,
construction began.10
Nixon’s statement only hints at the saga of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway,
a story that raises one theme above all others: promise. In the promise of this mammoth
project, some Americans heard economic salvation, others only environmental
destruction. In the debates surrounding proposals for the waterway’s construction, the
economic promises of southern politicians and regional economic development groups
10

“The Tenn-Tom: Pioneering Spirit Reflected in Waterway,” The Banner Independent
(Booneville, MS), March 30, 1978, p. 8; and “’Hypocrisy’ in the North Hit as Nixon Visits Alabama to
Dedicate Waterway,” The Commercial Appeal (Memphis, TN), May 26, 1971, p. 1.
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clashed with the competitive and sometimes dire predictions of the environmentalists,
railroad companies, and fiscal conservatives. Caught in the middle of this conflict were
the economically depressed populations of Alabama and Mississippi. Impassioned by the
progressive spirit of the Sunbelt South, the governments of these two states were guided
by the principles of economics, where the creation of jobs mattered more than the
project’s environmental consequences on fish and wildlife. Building the rhetoric of the
waterway’s promise was a coalition of southern politicians, business leaders, and regional
developers, who married the economic future of the region to that of the waterway’s
construction and assured southerners of the economic merits of the project. Waterway
proponents kept local expectations focused on their efforts and away from the concerns
of their opposition. In the end, project supporters overcame criticism with the combined
strength of strong Congressional leadership, dedicated local leaders, and an economically
desperate population solidly behind the promised economic benefits of the waterway.
For these individuals, the plight of wildlife was a luxury they could not afford when
facing the daily hardships of unemployment in the stagnant economic climate of the Deep
South.
Resting within the very ideological foundations of its national character, America
has traditionally held faith in the perseverance of science and engineering over nature.
One glowing example of this belief was the development of the nation’s vast
hydrological resources. In 1971, one project remained a dream in the minds of many
southerners—a manmade connection between the Tennessee and Tombigbee Rivers. The
first historical reference to such a project dates to the eighteenth century when the French
17

explorer, the Marquis de Montcalm suggested connecting the two rivers. Montcalm
believed that a link between these two water systems was paramount to the success of the
French kingdom. River traffic was the only viable means of moving supplies both in and
out of their territorial holdings along the Mississippi River and Gulf Coast and a channel
connecting the two rivers would greatly shorten that journey. However, French
dominance of the territory ended shortly thereafter. In 1810, citizens of Knox County,
Tennessee, petitioned Congress to shorten trade routes to New Orleans, Mobile and other
ports along the Gulf by more than 800 miles by constructing a channel between the two
rivers, but Congress ignored their plea. In 1874 President Grant ordered the first
engineering investigation for a connecting watercourse. The conclusion of this study
foretold that while the project was feasible, canal size restrictions and high costs
associated with constructing a waterway over the natural divide between the two river
basins made its economic justifications unfeasible. Still, the prospect of linking the two
rivers remained an enduring dream to the people of Mississippi and Alabama. 11
The appeal of a connecting water route between these two key southern rivers
strengthened as America industrialized. Throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers conducted several more studies that eventually led to
Congressional approval of the waterway in 1946. The increase in legislative support was
11

For example of historians writing about the perseverance of science and engineering over nature
see Frederick Jackson Turner, The frontier in American history (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1920);
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due in part to the successful development of the Tennessee River and Pickwick Lock and
Dam by the TVA in 1938. The pooled waters behind this hydroelectric dam formed
Pickwick Lake and raised the water level of the Tennessee River. This was a vital
component to Tenn-Tom construction as the Corps discovered that it could now construct
Bay Springs Lake at the same elevation as Pickwick Lake allowing the Corps to go
through the divide instead of over it like previous studies suggested. This development
marked a decrease in expenses and increase in economic profit potential when
overcoming the largest obstacle between the two rivers. Nevertheless, opposition formed
around two factions. First, Congressional members from other parts of the nation
competed for funding opportunities within their own areas and blocked further funding of
the project that they believed benefited only to the South. Second, the railroad industry,
fearing competition in an area dominated by their lines lobbied against federally funding
of transportation projects throughout the South. From the 1930s on, these factions
prevented any further development of the waterway until the 1960s.12
In 1968, under pressure from a coalition of leading southern Congressional
leaders, President Lyndon B. Johnson budgeted funds to kick start the project’s
engineering and design phases in order to retain the support of the region. Construction
began in 1971, during President Nixon’s first term. Critics of the president’s support of
the project, claimed this was part of his “Southern Strategy” for reelection, a means of
gaining votes within the South. Nixon’s supporters were quick to point out it merits to
regions both inside and outside the construction area. This “missing link,” waterway
12
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advocates dubbed it, would connect over ten thousand miles of navigable waterway
systems of mid-America with the Gulf of Mexico and the ports in Mobile, Alabama.
Regional developer Glover Wilkins testified at a presidential conference, “While the
waterway will afford tremendous opportunities for economic expansion of the region
transversed by the project, its significance far exceeds that of a regional development
project, since navigation benefits are expected to accrue to at least twenty-three states in
the South and Midwest. The Waterway will make many inland ports as much as eight
hundred to one thousand miles closer to the Gulf Coast or the mid-continent.” 13
In the eyes of the project’s supporters, the Tenn-Tom was a means of gaining
benefits for the populations closest to the project, namely Mississippi and Alabama, but
Tennessee, Kentucky and Florida as well. Similar to the social planning goals of the
TVA in the Tennessee Valley, Tenn-Tom proponents looked to spark economic growth
throughout the region by increasing its water infrastructure, but developers could not
depend on regional interests alone to help build the waterway. To keep construction
going, supporters needed to link the use of the Tenn-Tom to interests outside its
immediate area and ensure support for the project in other regions. With this in mind,
campaigners began associating the project with secondary benefits, such as the use of the
waterway by the defense and space industries.
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Located in the center of the “space crescent” with direct access to Huntsville and
the Marshall Space Flight Center, Michoud Operations at New Orleans, Mississippi Test
Operations in Hancock County, Mississippi, and the Launch Operations Center at Cape
Kennedy, the waterway offered a cheaper, alternative transportation route to the Gulf of
Mexico and shortened distances goods had to travel to reach these industries. These
savings in time and money appealed greatly to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (N.A.S.A). Due to the size requirements for much of their equipment,
NASA only used barges to transport missile and rocket boosters. With the construction
of the Tenn-Tom, this shortened the route from Huntsville to Cape Kennedy by 720
miles, reducing approximately one-third the distance and time, an average savings,
according to supporters of the waterway, of $10,000 per trip.14
The defense industry targeted cutbacks and savings of a different sort. The
waterway would allow the shipment of jet fuel to Columbus Air Force Base and Meridian
Naval Air Station in Mississippi and Oak Ridge in Tennessee, all-important military
installations. In times of national crisis, natural disasters, or war, the Tenn-Tom would
serve as an alternative route to the Mississippi River. This would provide the United
States with a vital military and economic link to the coastal waters of the Gulf of Mexico.
In a special presentation pamphlet on the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway provided to
the President and Congress in January 1969, Mississippi Senator John C. Stennis stated,
“Full Development of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway would make a substantial
14
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contribution to the nation’s economy and would add greatly to our military security by
providing an industrial base and additional transportation capabilities.” As Chairman of
the Armed Services Committee, there was no doubt that Senator Stennis was a key
supporter of the armed forces in the United States. Yet, Stennis did not focus all of his
support on military concerns. By combining his roles as Mississippi Senator and
Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Stennis symbolized the political efforts of
other southern politicians and saw the Tenn-Tom as an opportunity to advance the
economies of both his home state and the rest of the United States. 15
By highlighting the economic gains of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway,
political leaders like Stennis, strove to encourage growth in industrialized labor, a field
where the South still lagged behind the rest of the nation. Despite local and national
efforts to mitigate the poverty gap between the South and other regions in the post-World
War II era, the fact remained that the South lagged far behind the rest of the nation in
income, education, and employment opportunities. Tenn-Tom developers used this fact
as a rallying point in its favor. In 1976, Joe C. McCorquodale Jr., a speaker of the
Alabama House of Representatives remarked, “The South is going to control the nation in
the next 25 years. The South’s going to rise again.” Echoing this statement, Senator
Stennis promised at a dedication ceremony for the opening of the divide cut section of the
Ten-Tom waterway on May 6, 1984, “since the Civil War, people of the southeastern
United States have missed a lot of opportunities for growth, but this time we’re going to
be up front.” Rhetoric such as this promised that the Sunbelt South would no longer
15
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accept the traditional industrial divide between the region and the rest of the nation. It
was time for the South to take the reins of economic development initiative. A local
newspaper stated, “Many people in the area seem to regard it [the Tenn-Tom] as a way
out of an economic morass that has existed since the Civil War. The threat to Tenn-Tom
was viewed as a threat to their personal well-being and to the future of their children.”
For the common people of the project area, the promise of the waterway went beyond
their personal pocketbooks; its benefits spoke of a better future for generations to come.16
Southern political leaders were not the only ones recommending the Tenn-Tom as
a means for southern development. People throughout the region saw its promise as a
way to spur economic development and save local economies by using governmental
spending. Harry Rutherford, editor of the Tupelo Journal, saw the project “as the
blockbuster which will enable the people of this region to break forever the bonds of
poverty which have tied each succeeding generation to the past rather than to the glowing
future which I feel is all America’s for the having.” Poverty gripped all but a few large
plantation owners and members of the upper elite class even during the days of the
region’s perceived economic preeminence. While farm labor ruled in the Old South in
the Sunbelt South manufacturing and textile jobs were the leading employer of workers.
While the Old South imported labor, massive out migration was a growing and consistent
dilemma for most Southern states. Individuals like Rutherford editorialized that the
people of the South needed social uplift.17
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Bolstered by the popularity of the project within their home region, Tenn-Tom
advocates and southern Congressional leaders began to label the waterway as a “vital
link” to America’s water systems. Tennessee Representative John J. Duncan declared,
“Without the Tenn-Tom, the South’s capacity for future economic growth, not to mention
that of the great mid-section of America to be served by this waterway, would be greatly
handicapped.” The South’s image as a hampered region and impoverished territory
necessitated that its leaders improve its standing and the promise of the Tenn-Tom fit
their bill and looked like the only way to cure endemic Southern poverty. The call was
out for the rest of the nation to fulfill a moral obligation and buttress their slumping
brother. Paralleling Duncan’s stance, Mississippi Representative Charles H. Griffin
acknowledged, “The development of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway is of cardinal
importance to the continued economic growth and prosperity of Mississippi and the
Southeastern region of the United States.” By stressing the importance of the waterway
as a prerequisite for Southern improvement, Southern politicians also looked at
associating regional pride with the project. 18
While the waterway offered economic benefits for others outside the South, for
many southern politicians their primary goal was to foster development and growth
within their region. Borrowing historian John Boles’ words about advocates for regional
advancement during the Redemption years following the Civil War, “there was a strong
element of regional chauvinism, a desire to see the South share in national prosperity and
Clarion Ledger,” The Clarion Ledger (Jackson, MS) May 7, 1984. p. 1; and “The Tenn-Tom: Pioneering
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be independent of northern manufactured goods.” This belief was still recognizable
within the words of Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway supporters. The South’s
abundance of resources remained one of its greatest assets for development. As Alabama
Governor Albert Brewer bragged,
Alabama is abundantly blessed with rivers which are rapidly becoming
developed waterways. We in Alabama stand on a threshold of an era of
unparalleled economic growth and expansion. And our excellent resource
of waterways will play a vital role in the development of our potential.
The Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway is the key to unlocking this treasure
house of vast economic growth for it will join our waterways and the great
Port of Mobile with the expanding inland waterway network of midAmerica.
Advocates of the waterway saw it as an economic cornucopia and through their actions,
kept the region primed for economic development. Mississippi Governor John Bell
Williams remarked, "The Tennessee-Tombigbee is an ambitious project which is
certainly vital to the continuation of the economic progress of Mississippi. Our efforts,
those in the past and those to come, will be well rewarded when this project is completed.
It will mark the beginning of a new era.”19
The building of the Tenn-Tom’s promise was not isolated to the region’s business
and political leaders. Economic analyst Blanton Mizell stated, “Economic development,
as shown in this project, has no political boundaries. Cooperation by the federal
government, the states and local communities is necessary…You have shown that
together all units of government can work for the benefit of all.” He called for all levels
of government—local, state, and national—to cooperate for the benefit of everyone.
19
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Mizell continued, “It goes without saying that this project will have a dramatic effect on
the economic and population growth of a large part of the United States. This project
will create new opportunities for a richer and more fulfilling life in this area, and its
benefits will be felt worldwide.” Hubris of this sort resounded throughout Tenn-Tom
rhetoric, but paid little heed to the mounting expectations such promises were building.
Mizell finished, “The effect of this project includes most of the important ingredients for
the economic viability and independence of our Nation. Transportation, industrial
growth, and employment will all benefit.” While constructing the language of their
promise, waterway advocates linked the image of prosperity to those both inside and
outside the project’s area.20
During the 1950s, Southern states recognized the need of a governing body in
charge of spurring Tenn-Tom funding, construction, and economic development. In
1958, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Development Authority (TTWDA) was
established. This filled the waterway’s need for a local independent group operating
within the area of its construction. The TTWDA was a “Congressionally-sanctioned
multi-state compact.” Composed of the governors and five appointees from each of its
five member states, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Florida, it looked to
avoid the uncertainties of gaining private financing from Congress. Instead, it received
its funds from the five member states. Don Waldon, Deputy Administrator of the
TTWDA in 1985 explained its agenda, “The Authority had an advantage in that we had
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only one mission and that was to get the waterway built. State agencies had the same
interest in the waterway, but they had other interests to occupy their time.”21
The TTWDA was largely a promotional organization that backed the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers’ efforts on the waterway. While privately financed groups have
historically created organizations to gather local support for such projects, the level of
success the Development Authority experienced was remarkable. The Development
Authority worked “closely with the state and local chambers of commerce.” They
wanted to ensure that local businesses did not compete with one another. They balanced
the responsibilities of the states and local communities of the compact. Waldon
explained, “We want to look at it more from a regional perspective than a state.” Their in
lay the TTWDA’s uniqueness, as a multiple state organization with Congressional
sanctioning; it combined the political agenda of five states under the locus of federal
authority. Waldon continued,
Not to toot our own horn, but the members of Congress will
tell you, had it not been for the Authority – which is a unique
organization, its one of a kind – bringing together these five
states, the five governors, and you might say, the entire
Congressional delegations of those five state in a unified effort
toward securing the completion of this waterway – I’m not
saying it would never been built, but it certainly made it easier.
Clearly, TTWDA’s advantages went beyond just its private funding.22
With TTWDA in full operation, during the 1960s and 1970s the next line of
support for the waterway lay within the local populations of the construction area. Public
21
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relations became an important tool for the Development Authority and a means of
keeping local interest active. They used various media outlets to help stimulate and
maintain enthusiasm for the waterway throughout all levels of society. In promotional
literature, the TTWDA popularized the Tenn-Tom as the “best means to revitalize an
impoverished area.” By keeping the home fires burning, the TTWDA built upon the
waterway’s promise and supplied its Congressional representatives with all the political
clout they needed for lobbying for national support of the waterway. As southern
politicians supported funding for the waterway within Congress, they were rewarded with
votes at home. At the same time, by painting the promise of the waterway in such a
positive light the Development Authority members kept the local populace on its side and
away from the influences of outsiders. Under management from the TTWDA and
southern political figures, the people of Mississippi and other neighboring states
embraced the waterway with open arms. Blinded by the proposed benefits of the
waterway’s construction, and following the lead of the TTWDA, participants eagerly
packed courtrooms in support of the waterway. Don Waldon summed up the importance
of local support to the Tenn-Tom, “The key word in ‘regional grass roots’ is regional.”
From their positions as native sons, the southern politicians were able to secure local
support in favor of the project with its promise of economic development.23
Supporters of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway used a language reminiscent
of New South boosters. These men and women felt the days of the South lagging behind
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the economic potentials of the rest of the nation were at an end in the 1970s as in the
early twentieth century. A strong coalition of southern politicians, business leaders, and
regional developers, added to an enthusiastic populace embracing the demagoguery of its
leaders seemed to ensure the waterway’s construction. The fulfillment of these promises
of economic salvation seemed close-at-hand. However, before the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers could break ground on the project, opposition rose to halt construction. This
opposition came forth with ominous promises of its own.24
Opposition to the project came from environmentalists and the railroad industry.
First, a growing group conscious of the effects human growth and technology were
having on the environment, questioned the many negative environmental impacts on
native wildlife that would occur during construction and the unknown consequences of
combining the waters of two rivers separated for thousands of years. Additional concerns
centered on the construction requirements of the waterway itself. How would the twentyseven mile Divide Cut affect local aquifers and water levels? What impact would the
sinking of hundreds of thousands of acres of land have on local wildlife populations?
Despite numerous studies, no one could accurately predict the effects of the waterway on
local fish and wildlife, other than to know that it would undoubtedly change the land
forever. New social and political thought spurred people to begin questioning the
economic benefits of the Tenn-Tom in light of its impending damage to and destruction
of “intangible assets” of the environment.
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During the 1960s, while a national environmental movement formed in other
regions of the country, there was little evidence of the movement in the South.
Environmentalists from national groups had trouble establishing a “grass roots”
movement within the local populace. With the enactment of the National Environmental
Act of 1969 (NEPA), a new political change occurred, one that questioned the traditional
relationship between technology and nature. The growing national environmental
concern embodied by environmental groups like the Environmental Defense Fund, the
Audubon Society and many others, began scrutinizing the ecological consequences of
American waterways and looked to spark activism within the Tenn-Tom region, but was
largely unsuccessful. The local people of the territory repeatedly resisted the attempts of
outsiders to influence the appeal of the waterway, no matter the validity of their
environmental arguments and left most environmental opposition as coming from outside
the Tenn-Tom region.25
During the 1970s in an effort to spark criticism of the Tennessee-Tombigbee
Waterway, local and national environmental groups began to idealize the naturalness of
the Tombigbee River. A coalition of thirteen conservation organizations editorialized the
Tenn-Tom project as follows:
As draining on the American taxpayer as the project is,
it is even more of a drain on the rural counties through
which it passes. These areas need health and educational
facilities but are being taxed for a project that is the
25
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equivalent of “running a ditch through their land.” The
Upper Tombigbee River is the largest unimpounded and
unchannelized river left in the Mobile Basin. Turning the
river into a canal will eliminate one of the richest riverine
faunas in North America where 115 species of fish and 52
species of mussels can be found…the Tennessee and
Tombigbee ecosystems will be mixed, with unknown
consequences.26

Environmentalist objections included the project’s lack of flood control and
hydroelectric power production, the alarming effects of lowering water tables for local
populations, proper soil disposal problems, loss of cultural and archeological sites, and
the loss of the “largest remaining unimpounded, unchannelized river in the Mobile
Basin.” Dredge material was one of the largest environmental concerns due to its acidity,
infertility, and prodigious amount. As the largest public works projected ever attempted
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Tenn-Toms sheer size and the large volume of
required excavated material was unparalleled in U.S. history. Environmentalists
promised that wherever the material was disposed, ecosystem degradation would follow.
Exacerbating the problem of disposal location was the concern of erosion and its
subsequent damage to water quality as impurities seeped into local wells and aquifers.
Another anxiety was the oxbow lakes, which were created during the straightening of the
twisted course of the River section. By digging trenches through bends in the river, the
Corps created lakes out of old parts of the river no longer necessary for transportation.
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While their creation established a haven for wetland wildlife, if left unmonitored they
could seal up and dry out, creating the loss of more wildlife habitats.27
Despite the environmental arguments against the waterway, the Corps saw the
Tenn-Tom as a means of “enhancing” the land, not degrading it. Again, the Corps and
supporters of the project constructed a careful promise of a land that would be altered to
the benefit to both man and nature, a change environmentalists did not want. In 1976, a
local newspaper editorialized the Corps’s proposed land changes: “The basins for
thousands of acres of recreational waters will change the area’s landscape in the near
future. Today’s scarcity of large bodies of water for fishing and boating, as well as the
lack of campsites and hiking trails is scheduled to vanish under the touch of the
waterway.” The Corps promised that construction of the Tenn-Tom would follow the
mandates of NEPA and be built as “environmentally friendly” as possible. Even though
the environmental arguments against the waterway gave environmentalists plenty of
ammunition to fight the Tenn-Tom, the outpouring of enthusiasm by the local people
stymied their repeated attempts to rally the common people to their causes. In another
article the same newspaper stated, “Thousands of Americans are eagerly anticipating the
completion of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway because of its staggering potential for
industrial development. But it will also open up a wealth of recreational opportunities
that could in the long run, rival industrial expansion in benefits for the public. The
waterway will create 40,000 acres of lakes and five major reservoirs in an area
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landlocked and starved for water-related recreation.” Regional developers and the Corps
used the recreational benefits of the Tenn-Tom as a bonus to the economic gains of the
project and as a means of canceling environmental arguments. In the end the Corps’
attempts to live up to the mandates failed to appease the Environmental Defense Fund
and local environmentalists, who took the waterway to court twice, but ultimately
decided to challenge not only the waterway’s dangers to the environment, but
questionable economic benefits as well.28
Most notable among those who questioned the motives of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and the Tenn-Tom’s economics was Pennsylvania State University Professor
Joseph L. Carroll. In an article published in Transportation Journal, Carroll, who was
concerned about government misspending, questioned whether Congress and the public
should blindly trust the claims put forth by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
primary contractor for the waterway. He felt that the Corps falsely inflated the economic
gains of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway proposal in order to ensure its construction.
In a time of national deficit and hardship, the Corps, like many private businesses, looked
at its own funding needs instead of what some economists considered toward sound
economic judgment. Acting on its own volition, the Corps made several changes to the
waterway’s proposed and accepted waterway layout of 1971, breaking one of the
guidelines set forth by the NEPA. Carroll argued that these new plans should call for
new economic and environmental evaluations. He rejected the Corps’ claims that the
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1976 A.T. Kearny Management Consultants’ economic study remained valid in spite of
inflation, skyrocketing construction costs, and significant structural changes to the
waterway. In addition, the Corps felt that changes in design from a “Perched canal” to a
“Chain of lakes” and the additional flooding of 5,000 acres and water logging of 50,000
more were within its authority and should not require an additional Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS). In the upcoming court battles over the waterway, critics and proponents
alike used economic and environmental concerns in their arguments.29
A traditional narrative of environmental history tells how the modern man of the
twentieth century developed the American countryside with an industrious nature
unaware of its detrimental influences on the land. By the 1970s, the strive toward
progress no longer experienced the levels of autonomy of previous years. As the
environmental movement grew throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the
expertise of science no longer trumped environmental considerations in the nation’s
capital. Public awareness now held Washington accountable for the ramifications of
environmental destructions inherent in countless public works projects. The ebb and
flow of these two contesting currents created battlefields that pitted the hindering plight
of the environment against the invasive path of progress. Environmentalists sought aid
from many sources and in some cases joined forces with the economic rivals of public
works projects in response to fighting financially strong opposition. This was just the
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case when the Tenn-Tom’s economic and environmental promises clashed in two
momentous court battles in the 1970s and 80s.
Before the passing of the NEPA in 1969, most of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers’ activities remained hidden to the public eye. In 1964, Project Plowshare, an
alternative proposal projected by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission of excavating a
canal through the Divide section by simultaneously detonating a series of buried nuclear
explosives was just one example of a potentially damaging environmental procedure
proposed during the waterway’s construction. Fortunately, the restudy of the detrimental
effects of atomics showed them to be so inconsistent as to be “useless as a deciding factor
on whether to complete the waterway.” Yet, environmental questioning of the Corps
tactics in this and in other cases during the 1960s began a long series of fights in courts
on both the state and federal levels.30
Before and during the long planning and development phase of the TennesseeTombigbee Waterway, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers experienced a level of freedom
unprecedented in a public works project history. Congress’s lack of oversight and
scrutiny suggested that there was a “special” relationship between it and the Corps, one in
which Congress let the Corps operate independently and without a watchdog. William H.
Stewart believed in such a relationship and suggested that there was some reluctance for
congressional committees to question the results of Corps’s studies, often taking their
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word at face value. Moreover, both the Corps and members of Congress adopted an
attitude that the Corps was part of the executive branch and was responsible to Congress,
but only through the executive branch. This marked them as “hands off” to other
organizations and branches of the government. Stewart argued that the Corps appeared to
reside in a state of “limbo,” where it was an obvious component of the executive branch,
yet possessing a unique association, unlike that of any other executive agency. Before
the battles over the Tenn-Tom, Congress was content to accept the Corps’s promise that
its studies and findings were valid. A. T. Kearny Consultants seemingly validated this
belief in their 1976 restudy of the economic impact of the waterway. With the
implantation of NEPA this situation was about to change. In 1970, NEPA unbarred the
once locked doors of federal works projects. Before this legislation, agencies like the
Corps enjoyed the freedom to design and construct projects to their own standards.
NEPA mandated the inclusion of studies of environmental importance in all federal
projects. This not only made environmental issues important, it allowed individuals
access to information and a forum to express their concerns on a public record, the
Council on Environmental Quality. The authorization of NEPA gave environmentalists
and the railroad industry the legal means needed for obtaining the Corps’ information.31
Joining the environmentalists’ efforts to stop the waterway, but for an entirely
different reason, was the railroad industry. Stine remarked, “Federal navigation projects,
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no matter how economically and technically feasible they may appear to disinterested
observers, have natural critics, and the most vocal of these prior to the environmental
movement of the late 1960s and 1970s were the railroads.” The railroad industry was a
well-established mode of transportation within the South. Since the start of the twentieth
century, the South outpaced the rest of the nation in railroad construction, bringing it on
par with other parts of the nation. The region’s relationship with railroads spurred much
of its economic growth. As such, the railroad industry remained a private industry
concerned with competition at any level, and competition from a federally funded largescale water transportation corridor like the Tenn-Tom agitated them tremendously.32
In order to halt the construction of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, railroad
companies allied themselves with environmentalists. While environmentalism was a
concern to the Tenn-Tom because it tried to stop the economic promise of the project, to
the rival economic interests of the railroads, environmentalism became a useful ally. The
Association of American Railroads and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad had the
financial backing that the fledgling environmental movement lacked and needed in the
upcoming battles. The environmentalists realized that in order to receive the funding
required to fight the combined might of the Tenn-Tom supporters, they would have to lie
in bed with others. The Louisville & Nashville Railroad (L&N) in particular was
interested in stopping the waterway because its railroad paralleled the proposed route of
the waterway. The Association of American Railroads was also quick to oppose any
subsidized waterway construction, claiming that the railroad industry never enjoyed such
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benefits from the government. Fearing competition and a drop in income in a historically
closed regional market, the railroads wanted to keep their one horse race to themselves,
but to local people and towns within the South the days of benefiting from a railroad’s
presence had long passed. Now, railroads served mainly as a means of letting commerce
flow past rural towns with little benefits to their economies, a fate some economists
feared the Tenn-Tom would share without proper leadership. Without industries geared
toward utilizing railroads or in the case of the Tenn-Tom, a waterway, for transportation,
the people of the region would not benefit from the waterway’s mere presence. Local
communities needed to link new industries to s new mode of transportation.33
The strange bedfellows of the environmentalists and the railroads, rallied around
the fledgling power of NEPA in order to wage their fights. NEPA constructed a
procedural system to ensure that all federal agencies considered the values of
environmental preservations in their actions and made federal agencies systematically
assess the impacts their proposed actions would have on the environment. Then agencies
needed to adopt techniques that proposed alternative, less damaging ways of
accomplishing their missions.34
Together under NEPA, the environmentalists and the railroads took the waterway to
court in two epic battles, but throughout the long years of litigation, Tenn-Tom
supporters kept one image of the waterway alive and that was a picture of its economic
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promise. No matter the amount of criticism the waterway faced from environmentalists,
railroads, national media, and Congress, the people of the Tenn-Tom region clung
tenaciously to their leaders’ guarantees of the project’s benefits. Initiated in 1971, the
first court case challenged the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepared by the
Corps in agreement with NEPA mandates. Filed by the Environmentalist Defense Fund
(EDF), the Committee for Leaving the Environment of America Natural (CLEAN) and
Jim Williams a CLEAN organizer and assistant professor of biology at Mississippi
University for Women in Columbus, Mississippi, the plaintiffs argued that the Corps had
made a significant number of changes to its design without following proper NEPA
legislation. The plaintiffs argued that these changes would ruin twenty-four thousand
acres of forest and farmland, turn the Tombigbee River into a series of stagnant lakes,
and destroy archeological and historical sites throughout the region. The Corps
countered that the changes adopted were cost-cutting measures and were well within its
rights and did not necessarily require a supplemental EIS. However, with the enactment
of NEPA the Corps’ days of freedom to decide for themselves which tactics they would
employ during construction without facing outside scrutiny were over. Now they had a
higher authority to answer to and they had to adjust to a new world, one where
environmental considerations, not cost cutting measures took precedence.35
Recognizing the character and difficulties they may face in the upcoming court
battle, Southern politicians and the TTWDA worried about losing the waterway’s
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promise, lobbied to have the case heard in Aberdeen, Mississippi, close to the
headquarters of the TTWDA and smack dab in the middle of the waterway’s strongest
support base. Proponents of the waterway feared that a case heard in Washington would
give an edge to the growing national environmental movement, who had a strong
presence in the nation’s capital, but not in Mississippi. By moving the court case to the
South, the TTWDA could flood the courtrooms with enthusiastic supporters of the TennTom project. An early ruling by the District Court found the Corps to be in compliance
with NEPA standards, but in December of 1971, the 5th Court of Appeals issued an
injunction that kept construction on the middle section of the waterway delayed for
eighteen months. Federal District Judge, John Lewis Smith Jr., the man who issued the
injunction stopping waterway construction, felt that the EDF had made a “substantial
showing that the Army Corps of Engineers hadn’t fully complied with environmental and
fish and wildlife laws.” This provoked a negative response from many of the waterway’s
supporters who feared delays and stoppages would spell disaster for their carefully
constructed promise of economic prosperity. In response to the ruling by the 5th Court of
Appeals, Mississippi Senator James D. Eastland labeled the injunction as “a case of
blatant judicial tyranny.” He continued, “It is deplorable that a Federal judge has, with
one stroke of a pen, thrown a roadblock in the path of this great and envisionary project.”
Echoing the Senators statements were Alabama Representative Jack Edwards, who
claimed, “nothing, in my estimation, could create a more serene and beneficial effect on
the environment” than the Corps’ efforts on the Tenn-Tom and felt that the waterway’s
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promise was “being detoured from the road of progress by one judge and a handful of
unbending ecologists.”36
The problem Keady and other judges faced when making rulings on Tenn-Tom
was that there was no precedent established by NEPA. As a newly created legislation,
these new judgments would set the bar for NEPA standards, a bar that all future court
cases would follow. The problem judges faced in making their rulings was that no one
knew how powerful NEPA was meant to be, to what extent its policies could force
change, and how sharp its teeth should be. After months of deliberating, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers finally received the ruling they were looking for and continued
digging the waterway. Attacks by environmentalist, railroads, and economic critics
threatened the construction of the waterway, without which there could be no promise.37
Opposition to the waterway quickly regrouped. In November 1976, a second
lawsuit filed by a coalition of the L&N Railroad and the EDF of New York again moved
to stop the construction of the waterway. This time, legal action declared that the Corps
had not only violated NEPA mandates with alterations to its design and construction, but
also challenged the economic feasibility of the project by addressing the inflating
36
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construction costs and questionable cost/benefit ratio. This time the lawsuit led the 5th
Court of Appeals to rule on July 12, 1981 that “the plaintiffs have established that the
Corps has blatantly violated the NEPA and its own regulations by refusing to prepare a
supplemental EIS on the major changes since the 1971 EIS.” The Court went on to say
that pending completion of a final impact study, the Corps “cannot cause waters from the
Tennessee River to mix with the water of the Tombigbee River.”38
Again, the Corps was caught making new design changes to the waterway’s
layout without conducting additional impact statements. The Corps faced the difficult
challenge of constructing a cost efficient waterway, but one that also took proper
environmental precautions. During construction, the Corps encountered numerous
obstacles that required engineering expertise and ingenuity to overcome, but did not
always dawn on the Corps to conduct environmental investigations into their new
techniques. Through the process of building the Tenn-Tom, the Corps found that it had
to adapt not only new techniques of construction, but also a new way of thinking about
the way they affected the environment. Litigation lasted for seven years, but ultimately
the courts ruled in favor of the Corps after it produced a final impact statement.39
While the two court cases kept the Tenn-Tom in litigation for nine of its first
twelve years, it did not halt its construction, or stop its promise. Despite their failures,
the environmentalist did succeed in some ways. In 1985, Nathaniel D. McClure IV
wrote:
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The constant legal scrutiny made the Corps acutely aware of the need to
adhere to the spirit and intent of NEPA and other environmental statutes.
The opponents were constantly searching for evidence of error, omission,
or failure to comply with the statutes. Attorneys for the plaintiffs
consistently submitted letters to the Corps, commenting on the waterway
and alleging various deficiencies. It can be argued that all of the
environmental amenities incorporated into the Tenn-Tom would have
transpired even without the litigation, but realistically the reinforcement
afforded by these legal attacks probably had their influence.40
After loosing two court battles, the environmentalist and railroads conceded
defeat. This prompted TTWDA Administrator, Glover Wilkins to respond, “The front
reasons for the opposition were economic issues. But, those weren’t the issue – the issue
was competition. The Louisville and Nashville was concerned about who was going to
have coal from Appalachia to the eastern tidewaters.”41 This statement seemed to dismiss
the concerns of the environmentalists, but Wilkins was quick to point out the validity of
their arguments. He acknowledged their efforts by saying, “Now there was some sincere
environmental concern, and a lot of national environmental societies expressed their
concern. I think it was good they did because their case was heard. As a result, we
wound up with a waterway that is about as environmentally palatable as could be
possible.”42
The significance the two court cases against the Tenn-Tom were significant in
influencing its promise. Despite its opposition which threatened the promise of
40
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economics by trying to halt the waterway, they guaranteed that environmental protection
would be a lasting thing, a legacy shared in all future public works projects. Throughout
the years of planning and construction of the Tenn-Tom project, the Corps and waterway
supporters viewed the promise of the waterway and its subsequent changes to the
landscape of Mississippi and Alabama as environmental “enhancement,” not degradation
or destruction. The Corps felt that they had made proper concessions dictated by NEPA
and enacted the proper environmental considerations on all levels of the project, while at
the same time remaining true to the engineering demands of their trade. At the start of
construction in 1970 Colonel R.P. Tabb ordered the Corps to adopt tactics where the
“greatest effort should be spent where we have the greatest chance to make project
adjustments to better harmonize with the environment. Study in detail where the rock
hits the water but don’t try to chase every ripple to the shore and beyond.” The Corps
tackled construction of the waterway with their engineering genius, but with little
knowledge of environmental concerns. When faced with the mandates of NEPA and
forced to make appropriate changes, they brought in a conglomeration of outside experts.
They looked for these biologists, scientists, and archeologists to come up with the best
strategies to live up to NEPA’s environmental standards. While environmentalists may
have lost the fight to stop the waterway’s construction, they did ensure countless other
considerations and alterations to lessen its impact on the environment.43
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With victory assured in the court battles, the Corps diligently worked around the
clock to push the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway project past the point of no return. In
other words, they attempted to achieve a level of construction on the project in which it
would not be feasible to halt, because it would take more money to stop the construction
process than to continue with it. While competition from environmentalism and the
railroad industry succeeded in delaying the project in two court battles, the enduring
economic promise carried it through in the end. With the construction of the waterway
confirmed by the court decisions, waterway boosters turned their concerns to new ways
of ensuring its promise.
From 1983-1985, during the last years of the waterway’s construction, boosters
began altering their language around the waterway’s promise. Economic analysts
concerned about local efforts in utilizing the waterway added their voices to the growing
chorus. They warned that despite the assured completion of the project, the people of the
Tenn-Tom region needed to prepare for another hard-fought battle, this one concentrating
on regional economic development. Predictions about this new fight were often
warnings. In order to understand the waterway’s effect on the local economies, regional
developers needed to step-up their efforts in preparing sites and courting new industries
into the area. The result was a new discourse developed around issues pertaining to the
waterway not only during the years of its construction, but also in the forthcoming years
following its completion. Throughout this new discourse one nagging theme haunted the
efforts of developers and that was how to live up to their promise.
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As described earlier, the congressional leaders of Mississippi concentrated their
efforts mainly on the primary task of earning federal funding for the construction of the
waterway in order to guarantee the waterway’s promise of more jobs, industry, and even
environmental protection. In their eyes, these developments would remain largely a local
concern best handled at the state level. This did not mean that they abandoned local
considerations altogether. Many politicians experienced apprehension over the economic
development of their home states. Mississippi Senator Eastland supplied, “Two of the
counties in my district, Kemper and Noxubee, who are economically depressed, lacking
sufficient sources of income, are desperately in need of the economic shot in the arm.”
The endeavor to truly profit from the Tenn-Tom’s construction was not going to be an
easy task for anyone. The earlier assurances of the waterway’s economic benefits
glossed over the fact that to ensure development the local communities would have to
exhibit patience and make a concerted effort to market themselves to these new
industries. In recognition of the fact that the Tenn-Tom’s industrial development would
remain a continuous struggle in the development of Mississippi, Senator Stennis foretold,
“It’s going to be a real challenge to participate in and enjoy the fruits of that growth.”44
In the later years of the waterway’s construction, some experts began doubting the
ability of Mississippi’s leaders to enact the changes necessary to ensure native benefits
from the waterway before its completion. Robert McArthur, a political science professor
at the University of Mississippi argued, “The difficulty Mississippi has is we have no
strong coordinating element between the state and local levels.” His doubt fixated on the
44

Tenn-Tom Topics: Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Development Authority, Vol. 1 No. 3,
November, 1975: 3; and Leigh Hogan, Special to The Clarion Ledger, p. 1.

46

fact economic growth along the canal depended on how the state government coordinated
its developmental efforts. McArthur continued, “What you need is some way in which
the state can set priorities for development and the local developers can follow those
priorities if they want state and federal assistance.” In a state historically reluctant to
follow the suggestions of outsiders, rural Mississippians in the impacted Northeastern
sector of the state looked toward supervision from local sources. To them, it remained
imperative that these supervisors were native sons and daughters, insiders who held the
same conservative goals and expectations as the local populace.45
Arguing against the economic arrogance accompanying the Tenn-Tom, McArthur
warned that the people of the Tombigbee Valley should not “feel the opening of the
waterway will make us like the Ruhr Valley in Germany.” He worried that many
believed that Northeast Mississippi would become “an industrial heartland instantly.”
After many long years of listening to the proposed benefits of the waterway,
Mississippians looked for an instant gratification in reward for their steadfast support of
the project. The picturesque vision of the Tenn-Tom’s economic benefits painted by the
politicians had snowballed into mountainous expectations within the hearts and minds of
Mississippians. McArthur tried to caution them, “Just because we’ve got the waterway
doesn’t mean we’ll get all the industries we want.” Adopting the warnings of Stennis, he
counseled, “It’ll be longer than many people think it will be, but it will come if we get all
our horses together.” The nagging question remained. Would the leaders and the people
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of Mississippi be able to harness their horses into a working strategy that would profit by
the waterway’s construction? 46
Agreeing with McArthur’s view, Mississippi Governor Bill Allain expressed a
similar sentiment that the state needed “some board or district, or overall umbrella
operation to bring it all together.” From the beginning, Allain realized the delicate
ground that he was treading on with the people and business leaders of Mississippi. “I
want you to know up front that we are here to assist you and cooperate with you and act
as a coordinator for your local efforts,” was the sentiment he delivered to a crowd
gathered at Mississippi University for Women in September of 1984. He suggested that
he was not there to deliver “great words of wisdom from Jackson,” but rather to offer
suggestions. In the face of regional interests, Allain was quick to point out that the state
government was “not here to tell you [the local leaders] how you must develop, how you
should develop,” but rather offer the use of a “repository of information about
development along the Tenn-Tom.” By adopting a stance of passive suggestion, rather
than an aggressive leadership role, Allain looked to circumvent an inherent reluctance to
act that was prevalent in local business interests in a regionally divided state. Business
leaders were having a hard time convincing local people that new efforts were needed in
order for local economies to gain the benefits of the Tenn-Tom developers’ promise.47
As a supporter of the waterway, Governor Allain continued the pledge of its
promise, “The Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway will put Mississippi in front of other
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states vying in the battle for industrial development and will improve the state’s
economy.” He continued, “It’s one of the greatest opportunities Mississippi has ever
had…We can get ahead of Tennessee and Alabama in getting industries.” Yet, it seemed
a lingering doubt darkened his thoughts. Despite his bold statements on the importance
of the project, Governor Allain feared the Tenn-Tom development would come to
resemble the western, undeveloped side of the state. Allain’s concern dated back to the
days of his youth. Looking back upon the days of his childhood in Natchez, a city
located on the banks of the Mississippi River, the governor remembered the fact that the
“state’s greatest natural resource” remained a “virtually untapped” theatre. Allain
recalled, “There’s no development of the Mississippi side of that river. We used to go
down there and wave at the boats as they came by.” He warned, “That’s all we’re going
to be doing [in northeast Mississippi] unless we have enthusiasm in developing the TennTom.” It seemed that the Mississippi and other state were indeed lacking a coordinating
body charged with the development of the Tenn-Tom’s promise.48
Both McArthur and Allain seemed to forget one institution that had worked for
the waterway on the local level, a regional organization responsible for grass root efforts
since the 1950s, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Development Authority. The
TTWDA, which aggressively lobbied Washington during the waterway’s construction,
did not dissolve upon certainty of the waterway’s completion. Deputy Director of the
TTWDA, Don Waldon, admitted to a growing apprehension about the development of
Mississippi along the Tenn-Tom. He supplied, “at first there was some concern that the
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state would dictate the development of the waterway.” However, with Allain’s and
other’s assurances that the state government would take a passive role in the process,
Waldon gathered the local mayors and business leaders into a combined sphere of
regional influence under the leadership of the TTWDA. Coordinating their efforts with
local communities, the TTWDA fought for economic gains with the same tenacity they
had shown in the court battles and Congressional funding debates opposing the
waterway’s construction. Together the TTWDA and local business leaders drafted what
they thought were the best strategies for development along the waterway and continued
grooming the people of Mississippi into associating the Tenn-Tom with the salvation of
their economic future.49
During the construction years of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway one theme
dominated the rhetoric of politicians, regional developers, local business leaders, the
railroad industry and even the environmentalists and that was the promise of the
waterway. To some the promise meant salvation from an economic moroseness that had
plagued the region since its decline after the Civil War. To others, the waterway meant
the promise of changes to and the possible destruction of natural wildlife habitats for the
sake of mediocre and unjustifiable economic gains. In 1983, during his final ruling
dismissing the second lawsuit targeting the waterway, Judge William C. Keady stated:
We must leave to the verdict of history, which may probably not represent
an informed judgment until the next century, whether the TennesseeTombigbee Waterway will prove to be the great boon and national
treasure which its supporters in and out of Congress, have both vigorously
and consistently claimed, or whether as predicted by its foes, it will be a
49
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colossal injury to the area’s environment brought about by wasteful
expenditure of public funds.50

In the end, the powerful coalition of southern politicians, highlighting the political
strength of the Solid South combined with the financially secure lobbying efforts of the
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Development Authority to outfight the fledgling efforts
of environmentalists bolstered by a competitive spirit and the financial backing of the
railroad industry. In order to ensure their victory, Tenn-Tom boosters built a gargantuan
mountain of expectations in the waterway’s promise. They did this because they had to.
After decades of striving to achieve a dream of connecting the rivers, developers finally
succeeded, but the inflated promise that carried the waterway could easily bury it under
the crushing weight of so many hopes and dreams. In the years after its opening, the
question remained…which vision of the Tenn-Tom’s promise would hold true?
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CHAPTER III
FULFILLING THE PROMISE: LIVING WITH THE ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS
AND EXASPERATIONS OF THE TENNESSEE-TOMBIGBEE WATERWAY

On the morning of January 10, 1985, a bitterly cold wind swept through the
Tombigbee Valley, as the tugboat Eddie Waxler cast off from Mobile, Alabama to make
the maiden voyage on the newly opened Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. On this frigid
winter day, hosts of cheerful well-wishers braved the freezing weather to meet and
welcome the towboat throughout its journey up the waterway. For many, the completion
of the Tenn-Tom warmed their hearts with the glowing promise that a new future had
dawned for a region of America where economic opportunity was a bleak reality. Each
stop at one of the waterway’s ten brand-new locks heralded a new round of optimistic
speeches and celebrations from excited greeters.51
For one group meeting the boat on its multi-day sojourn, more than frosty winds
stung their hearts and brought tears to their eyes. As the Eddie Waxler passed under a
bridge near the northern end of the waterway where U.S. Highway 72 crossed overhead,
they sat huddled together for more reason than to just ward off the weather’s chill. They
all came to see one thing, the culmination of a dream that had cost them so dearly. As the
towboat floated under the bridge, a prophetic message
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drifted down from the throng. Dropped from the hands of a member of the group was a
hand-written poem on yellow notebook paper, it read:
For the past, the times that I knew as a child
I played, I lived, and I grew
In a land where the waters now flow,
I bid you, “Hello.”
For that past is now gone,
As for the future, you now travel on,
Both a sad and happy day.52
The writer of this poem was Treva Jane Belue and like her, the onlookers
gathered at the bridge were all natives of Holcut, a small rural village located in the hill
country of Northeast Mississippi. More than a decade earlier, during the formative stages
of Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway development, Holcut’s residents found that they lay
in the pathway of the waterway’s promised economic future. While the Tenn-Tom
comprised 110,000 acres of land from both Alabama and Mississippi, requiring great
sacrifices from many of the inhabitants of both states, no one could claim to have
sacrificed more to the project than the people of Holcut, who literally gave up their
homes, farms, and beloved community to the waters of the project.53
While Holcut was never a large population center or area of regional economic
importance, it was a small rural community, indicative of the many small towns dotting
the waterway’s route. The village center consisted of a single shirt factory, a couple of
country stores and several dozen uninspiring houses. A local newspaper writer described
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Holcut as follows, “Home, in these parts, is not six rooms and a two-car garage down the
street from the quick stop. It is where your father was born—‘your people,’ as they say,
have always been here. They dug the well. They planted the trees. They built the house.
You know all the neighbors. They are families—generations of families—like yours.
That is what becomes a community. Holcut was a community.”54 The people of Holcut
were typical rural Southerners, individuals who eked out meager livings in the traditional
southern occupations of agriculture, blue-collar jobs, and a limited number of factory
jobs. The one trait that marked Holcut’s residents was that they hailed from one of the
poorest sections of Mississippi and therefore the entire country. When progress came
knocking on their doors in the form of the Army Corps of Engineers and the economic
promise of the waterway, the townspeople were asked to give up their land in order to
reduce construction costs. Located on the natural ridge separating the two river
watersheds, Holcut was at the wrong place at the wrong time. Construction of the TennTom required the Corps to cut a 39-mile long channel through the hills of Northeast
Mississippi. Due to the high cost of large-scale excavations, engineers selected a route
that avoided solid rock formations. Instead, they chose a route consisting of an area
composed of the softer, silty-sand of the Eutaw Formation. Holcut lay on the shortest
route between the two rivers.55
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Spurring the region’s march toward progress during the 1970s and 1980s was the
economic promise of the waterway. The promise was so pervasive within the region that
most people held faith that what ever was best for the waterway was best for them. If this
meant that individuals like Holcut’s residents needed to surrender their town for the
promise of a better economic future for both themselves and their neighbors, then so be
it. A Corps negotiator for land purchases remarked on the common appeal of the
waterway: “Certainly there are some people who don’t want to sell their property. As a
general rule, it may create some hardships…But I’d say that 90 percent of the time you
get favorable reaction from them.” Caught within the huge surge of regional optimism
limited by a parochial view of the economic promises of the Tenn-Tom, the people of
Hocut found little support in any efforts to save their homes. When informed that they
had to sell their homes, most of Holcut’s residents simply did. In 1977, Lonnie Wheller
reported, “They sold—some of them immediately, because they figured they had to.”
Although many sold their land without much fuss, some tried to fight for their homes.
Hocut native, Weldon Claunch defied attempts at purchasing his home saying, “I don’t
have anything for sell. If I hadn’t wanted that spot in the first place, I wouldn’t have
gotten it. I don’t have any property for sell.” In another article, Wheeler wrote of other
residents losing land to the coming of the waterway. She described how Mr. and Ms.
Moore natives of Fulton, Mississippi faced the uncertainties of losing their home and how
their reluctance to give it up placed them outside the social norm. Wheeler stated, “And
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so everybody Mrs. Moore knows is in favor of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway
project. She would be, too, she says—if she knew she didn’t have to leave her house on
the hill. In town, at a store recently, she was asked to sign a petition in support of the
waterway. “I had to tell them that I’m just not in favor of signing it. I can’t be. It’s hard
for me to be different. But recently, I’ve been feeling like I have my rights, too.””
Unfortunately, one of the ramifications of federal projects like the Tenn-Tom is that
people lose their land and a person’s rights often get trampled along with their dreams of
keeping their homes.56
In the Holcut area, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers purchased 1,500 acres of
land. They displaced roughly one hundred people in twenty-eight homes. Most of these
individuals were lucky and only had to move “up the road” a ways to new land and
homes. Low population density and decades of migration out of the region left former
residents with many opportunities for resettlement in neighboring communities. While a
few individuals along the waterway’s route tried to oppose its construction, the
townspeople of Holcut largely recognized the futility of such endeavors. In part, their
complacency was a product of familiarity. Losing land to government projects was a
common experience to the people of the Tombigbee Valley. They recognized that they
traveled down a similar path to their northern neighbors in the Tennessee Valley. Forty
years before, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) acquired large tracts of land in the region and those valley residents who resisted
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achieved nothing in the end other than the federal condemnation of their land and
eviction by governmental forces. The people of the Tombigbee Valley recognized the
fact that when the Corps came, it came with “an offer they can’t refuse.” In Holcut,
Archie Burleson, owner the general store confirmed this belief, saying, “It was either take
the last offer, or they would put up a condemnation order and I would have to go to
court.” The only decision the court would ultimately decide was the price of an
individual’s land. Landowners were offered “fair market value” as determined by outside
appraisers. Yet, this gave little consideration to person’s individual attachment to the
land. Hoclut native James Pardue stated, “You can’t put a price on the sentimental
value.” For individuals like Pardue, Burleson, Claunch, and the Moores, the only life
they knew was living on the same patch of land for most if not all of their lives. They
were born there, grew up there, and most planned to die there. It was an enduring belief
common to many of the region’s inhabitants, a dream that was coming into conflict with
another dream just as old and enduring.57
To Holcut’s citizens meeting the waterway on the bridge that day in 1985, the
plan of combining the waters of the Tennessee and Tombigbee Rivers was a long time in
coming, and was an idea that they had lived with and waited for decades to manifest.
J.V. Grimes, an older resident of Holcut, explained, “I had heard talk about the canal ever
since I was big enough to hear anything. But I never thought about it taking our home.”
Grimes had lived at the same piece of land since 1918, but when the Corps came in 1975,
he sold like the rest. Remembering his home, Grimes stated, “I had just got it like we
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wanted it. We had a little orchard and a garden started. We had to leave all that fruit—
I’d worked sixteen and a half years. We had the finest orchard around.” Despite the
many regrets described, by the time the Corps officials arrived at Holcut’s doorstep, most
of the area’s residents recognized the benefits of going along with the project. The
government paid individuals for their land, relocation expenses, and tried to help them
find replacement homes. While the fair market price offered by the government was
supposed to be enough to replace the homes lost by former residents, some residents
learned that it was not enough to replace their older homes. The new homes and land
they were purchasing were bought at modern prices. The money they received for their
older homes, many of which were passed down by family and kin or paid for years ago,
patched together by the same hard labor required to eek a meager living from the land
bought considerably less than needed to replace them. The government’s shortcomings
in making reparations to Holcut’s citizenry left many bitter over their loss.58
Rovel Pardue remarked about loosing his home, “I didn’t like it. I didn’t like it
worth a damn. They said they would set everyone up just as good as they was. By God,
I had to go into debt.” Arnie McAnally after moving to a new house “up the road” from
Holcut said, “It’s not like livin’ down there. I been down there all my life. Yeah, I miss
it. But, I ain’t got no griping to be done. I sold it to ‘em. But it cost me more than I
thought to build back up. A lot more. I wouldn’t sell now for what I did.” The pain of
loosing their homes was doubled by the loss of their limited personal wealth. They felt
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that going into debt to make way for the waterway was the exact opposite of the promise
of its economic progress, a burden that they alone were asked to carry.59
In 1977, citizens watching the Corps tear down and haul off Holcut’s buildings
found it a difficult sight and most had trouble recalling the image of waterway’s promise
of progress as their community died. The heavy earth moving equipment moved in and
started reshaping the land gouging a humongous trench through the countryside. With
the future of the waterway still in doubt at the time, Arnie McAnally commented on the
Corps’ efforts around the former site of Holcut saying, “They don’t ruint [sic] the
country. I don’t want to see ‘em stop it now.” One last vestige of Holcut outlasted many
of the others and that was the community’s general store. At morning, lunch, and dinner
waterway workers stopped at the store to buy drinks and grab a quick bite to eat. While
this was a slight boom for one former resident, it was only a temporary one, as the store
was eventually torn down like the other buildings. But for several years during the late
1970s, the store served as a meeting place for some of its former inhabitants after they
sold their land. These individuals hung around the store socializing with other past
residents and trying to find work on the waterway or even the occasional odd job in order
to pay their bills.60
Many of the town’s inhabitants tried to find work along the Tenn-Tom, but most
were unsuccessful. This added to the bitterness many of them felt toward the waterway.
Talking of the loss of his home and the waterway’s promise of jobs, James Pardue said,
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“Okay. They’ve got it. They’ve got your land, we’ve got the waterway. Okay. Let’s get
going. Let’s get a job and make some money. They say the waterway brings jobs. Well,
then, how come we can’t get some of ‘em? I talked to a guy on the fence crew today—
he’s from Phenix City, Alabama. That’s all the way to the Georgia line. All we want
now is jobs. That’s what we’ve looked for all our lives. You give up for progress, and
then you can’t help it progress.” Unfortunately, the number of jobs available along the
waterway remained limited in an economically strapped region. While the government
contracts tried to encourage contractors to employ local workers as much as possible,
several factors worked against Holcut’s citizens. Most of the labor along the Tenn-Tom
required a high level of skill from their workers and many of the area’s residents were
unskilled and poorly educated. This was especially the case in the area surrounding
Holcut, because it offered an extreme challenge to engineers trying to overcoming the
obstacle of the divide between the two rivers. A second factor working against the
predominantly white population of Holcut’s citizens was the implementation of
aggressive hiring of minority workers throughout the project area. Created as a means to
ensure fair labor practices in companies receiving government contracts on the waterway,
it forced many companies to change their hiring criteria. Many of these outside
contractors had to favor minorities when hiring local labor to ensure that they met the
government’s quota. Roy Medley described his frustration about seeking a job working
for the waterway: “What makes me mad is that they take your home and land, then tell
you that you can’t work for ‘em.” Medley a former Air Force computer operator and
trained heavy equipment operator tried to find a job as a “grease monkey or anything,”
60

but could not find steady employment on the waterway. Skilled or not, Holcut’s former
townspeople found it exceedingly difficult to find the benefits of the Tenn-Tom’s
promise.61
Despite being 234 miles long and the largest public works project ever completed
by the Army Corps of Engineers, the Tenn-Tom could not fulfill everyone’s expectations
for employment. This problem only exaggerated in the years following the waterway’s
completion as the people of the region felt their economic hopes went largely unfulfilled.
The numbers of jobs provided both during construction and in the years after its opening
had trouble measuring up to the waterway’s constructed dream, one that seemed to
promise that everyone would experience economic boon. This was an impossible task as
the waterway could never conceivably provide jobs for everyone.
Realizing that they would largely miss out on the new jobs provided by the
watery, Holcut’s citizens began asking for another concession. Instead they began asking
for a memorial or landmark honoring the loss of their village and they were still waiting
for it that day on the bridge in 1985. Commenting on his desire to see their wishes
fulfilled that day, Congressman Jamie Whitten commented, I’m in favor of a marker. I
want people to know that folks lived here and that sacrifices were made for progress.”
With permission and help of the Army Corps of Engineers, the former residents later
enshrined the memory of their community’s fate in a noble light, viewing their loss as a
sacrifice, a means of giving themselves, the region, and the nation a chance to improve.
With its fate sealed in 1976, Holcut became “the only community acquired for
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construction of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway.” A road marker at the former site
of the town salutes “Holcut and its former residents for the greatness they displayed in
sacrificing for the future.”62
The story of Holcut’s sacrifice is important because it describes one of the
secondary consequences of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway and speaks of the
underlying personal costs associated within the construction of its promise and
emphasizes the limitations of waterway’s economic reach. The sacrifices of Holcut’s
residents and the many other individuals who gave up their homes demand historical
analysis in order to determine if their losses were justified. Their struggles in finding the
promised economic benefits of the waterway were a fate shared by many others in the
years after the waterway opened. It also shows that there was a small voice of dissidence
among local populations and its resonance was the planting of seeds of doubt in the
minds of some local residents. The personal costs of the waterway throughout the region
began to add up, forming a small but growing counter narrative. These individuals were
not blinded by the guarantees of the waterway’s economic leaders, and they bitterly
waited the fulfillment of its promise. Despite popular opinion, not all people subscribed
to the belief of waterway’s promise and these individuals would soon be joined by others
unhappy with the waterway’s economic shortcoming in the years following its opening.
Rushing to benefit from the opening of the waterway, communities strove to gear their
economies toward this new form of industry.
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Opening amid a sea of expectation, the Tenn-Tom quickly fell victim to a rushed
interpretation, turning expectations to exasperations when economic transformation failed
to manifest. Despite Mississippi Governor Bill Allain’s 1986 warning that “every town
along the waterway can’t have a port with an industrial park filled with factories,” people
all along the waterway expected instant benefits. As communities industrialized, locals
of all sorts rushed their judgment of the Tenn-Tom. They largely failed to see what some
experts claimed were secondary benefits of the waterway.63
During the early years after the project’s opening, communities located up and
down the waterway’s banks struggled to adjust their business efforts and develop new
industries necessary to capitalize on the waterway. Lack of funding and the waterway’s
early completion date however, left most developers unprepared for economic activity. It
would take several years of maturation before most communities developed the industrial
parks, ports, and marinas necessary to take advantage of the waterway’s promise. After
poor initial showings in commerce plying the Tenn-Tom’s waters, doubters quickly wrote
it off as a colossal failure. Yet the supporters and dreamers of the project remained
convinced of its benefits and looked at different factors to justify its construction and
mitigate the waterway’s perceived economic shortcomings. These two differing and
often conflicting interpretations of the Tenn-Tom’s economic benefits reveal the
uncertainties major public works projects face in a society with a critical eye toward the
negative aspects of federal expenditures. For people outside the immediate area of these
projects the transformations to local communities remain hidden and outside their notice.
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While national media described the Tenn-Tom as a colossal failure, local developers
remained committed to its economic promise.
On May 6, 1984, at a ceremony honoring the completion of the Divide Cut,
Mississippi Senator John C. Stennis proudly proclaimed, “I stand here in confidence that
this project and its future uses 10 years, 100 years, 200 years, 300 years and even a good
while more, will serve this area and serve this area well.” Throughout the years of its
construction, supporters of the project showed economic hubris of this sort when
extolling the virtues of the Tenn-Tom’s economic benefits, but the conviction of Senator
Stennis’s words predicted the permanency of the waterway and hinted at how long
regional boosters would need to remain committed to the ideals of the waterway’s
promise. Stennis continued, “It will give a better opportunity to the people in northeast
Mississippi to have the things that make life worthwhile. I’m confident of that.” Despite
his bold prediction, in the years preceding the Tenn-Tom’s opening, Stennis and other
waterway advocates struggled to industrialize the region and develop the auxiliary water
infrastructure needed to capitalize on the waterway’s benefits. After receiving the huge
amounts of federal monies during the construction of the waterway, the cash strapped
states of Alabama and Mississippi lost their wellspring of outside money. The lion’s
share of developmental dollars needed to build the auxiliary infrastructures and facilities
necessary to capitalize on the waterway’s economic promise had to come from local
sources. Without outside aid, development costs were too much for these states of
Mississippi and Alabama to handle. Further complicating their efforts was the earlierthan-expected completion date of the waterway, changes in the national and global
64

economic climate, and harsh national criticism of the project. These setbacks combined
and quickly labeled the Tenn-Tom as a failure, a boondoggle of monumental proportions.
The grandeur of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway’s engineering feats
accomplished during construction lost preeminence and became buried under its harsh
economic criticism. For a world with little patience, the Tenn-Tom needed to provide
instant gratification to the nation, the region, and the local populations. When it became
apparent that these changes were not immediate, national critics joined by some local
business leaders eager for economic stimulus lost faith in the waterway’s promise. The
early difficulties supporters of the waterway faced seemed to leave the communities
located along the banks of the Tenn-Tom with the grim reality that development was
slow in coming, and many wondered if it would ever come at all. During the early years
of operation, Alabama and Mississippi communities found themselves stranded with
many half-finished or deserted port facilities, while local populations waited for the
expected economic bonanza foretold in the waterway’s coming. People all along the
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterways began to resemble the underdeveloped Mississippi
River side of the state, a reminder of the painful image of Holcut’s residents standing on
the banks of the waterway waving at the passing boats and their symbolism of economic
promise passing them by.64
Despite local residents’ joy during the opening of the waterway in 1985, there
were earlier warnings that the waterway’s promise for Mississippi and Alabama’s
economic progress was going to an arduous journey, one that would require great
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fortitude from their developers. In the years leading up to the waterway’s opening,
experts tried to counsel local developers that they needed to remain focused on the job at
hand. These warnings placed a priority on the responsibility of providing industries
interested in locating to the banks of the waterway with viable installations, ports,
harbors, and industrial parks and responsibility of these developments would fall squarely
on state and local developers’ shoulders. “I think from this day on, the responsibility is
going to be the local and state governments,” agreed Dan Sanders, president of the
Amory Chamber of Commerce. By itself, the waterway was only a transportation
corridor, it would fall to the local efforts of regional, state, and individual municipality
developers to mould themselves into areas that businesses would want to locate. Tim
Weeks, the economic development coordinator of the Daily Journal in Tupelo,
Mississippi informed readers that the waterway would be just a “large ditch” navigated
by barges flowing past their communities, if people did not do their part in bringing in
industries. He cautioned:
It is hoped the waterway will have a significant long-term effect
on the economy of a rural region that has languished behind national
levels of wages and income. It is important to realize that growth in the
waterway region will be limited only by world and national economic
conditions and the vision and energetic participation of our own people
here in Northeast Mississippi. We have no control over the former.
However, on the local and regional level we are in control of our own
destinies. It is up to us to aggressively seek to turn ‘potential’ into
realistic economic growth.

This meant that communities had to improve roads, schools, and other key institutions,
grooming themselves as a region capable of supplying not only a valuable transportation
corridor, but also a quality workforce with appropriate auxiliary infrastructures and
66

facilities. “Industries need more than the waterway,” Weeks added, “Without an all-out
development effort, the Tenn-Tom will never make a dynamic impact on our
economy.”65
In 1983, Carroll LeTellier, former head of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’
South Atlantic Division, cautioned that “the path ahead may be even more difficult” than
even the difficult years of the waterway’s construction. After hearing the news of the
surrender of the second lawsuit contesting the waterway he asserted, “The times ahead
are not for celebration but for hard work.” Afraid that the cooperative spirit that worked
so well in ensuring the construction of the Tenn-Tom would fracture after its opening,
LeTellier coached, “Now is not the time for states and communities to become
competitors.” Pivotal to LeTelleir’s argument was his insistence that the TennesseeTombigbee Waterway Development Authority (TTWDA) remain active in securing
cooperation between local industrial developers and businesses interested in utilizing the
waterway in the long years after its opening. LeTellier argued that “it is imperative” to
keep the TTWDA together as “a strong, powerful, and knowledgeable body” which could
rally local interests to a common cause and watch over the varied developmental interests
of the region.66
Answering the region’s need for a well-informed and unified development
agency, the TTWDA remained in operation in the years after the completion of the
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waterway. Changing their primary focus away from lobbying Congress for construction
funds, a task that carried them through the first twenty-five years of their existence, the
TTWDA turned their efforts toward regional economic development. At a Tenn-Tom
development conference in November 1983, LeTellier predicted, “The future battles will
be to insure that the Tenn-Tom is developed in an orderly fashion, with planning to
provide for local needs all along the waterway’s corridor.” Local communities responded
with efforts toward building needed infrastructure like bridges and roads, industrial parks,
ports and marinas, but the uncertainty of limited financial backing hampered their
contributions. For its preliminary mission, the TTWDA turned its focus to a five-year
plan that would stress maximum cooperation between states, communities, and regions of
the Tenn-Tom. In order to avoid unnecessary conflicts or regional competition that
would hamper economic development, the TTWDA mapped out new plans and strategies
for communities to follow before the waters flowed in 1984. With these new schemes in
mind, the Development Authority attempted to charm industries and entice outside
interest to the region, employing whatever tactics they could in order to get businesses to
move to the waterway’s shores. They kept their powerful propaganda engine alive, doing
their best to illuminate the waterway’s benefits to outside interests. For local business
leaders they stressed the importance of long-term goals. They saw development along
the Ten-Tom as a marathon not a quick sprint. Don Waldon, the new TTWDA president,
echoed the warnings of others and clung to the belief that the future of the waterway
would be as troublesome as its past. Waldon stated, “A lot of people may not appreciate
this, but it may be as great a challenge to develop the waterway as it was to build it.” He
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warned doubters that while the road ahead was uncertain, through careful planning and
sheer determination the region would live to see the Tenn-Tom’s promise materialize.67
Complicating the efforts of the Development Authority and other developers was
the accelerated pace of construction on the waterway. In 1981 the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers under pressure from their political backers who were concerned over losing
federal funding, erected floodlights and worked day and night to push the waterway past
a “point of no return.” This ensured the construction of the waterway, but completing it
two years ahead of schedule resulted in the Tenn-Tom opening before many of the port
facilities and auxiliary infrastructures of local communities were finished. In a
financially depressed region, the waterway’s states, cities, and communities struggled to
meet the funding requirements needed to match the Corps’ accelerated pace. However,
this problem did not affect everyone in the region equally. For states linked to the TennTom’s waters, but not located on its banks, the early opening did not adversely affect
their preexisting industries and ports. Benefiting from the nature of their geography,
states like Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio had long ago constructed the facilities they
needed to conduct water commerce and they enjoyed the added bonus of having
established businesses within their borders. For the new waterway communities of
Mississippi and Alabama, their facilities were either not-in-place or stuck in the early
stages of planning. Mississippi in particular had difficulty building up its infrastructure
as most of its cities were former landlocked ones or at best equipped only for shallow
river or creek portages. The early opening of the waterway meant that the industries that
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were interested in utilizing the waterway either had to wait for development or turn to
other areas for their facilities.68
Working under the watchful eye of the TTWDA, local communities’ geared their
industrial efforts toward capitalizing on the waterway’s economic benefits through a
variety of ways. In Pickens County, Alabama local developers looked at overcoming
physical barriers blocking them from the waterway’s promise by constructing a bridge
across the waterway. Residents of Pickensville, an isolated, rural community, anxiously
watched the construction of a $75 million Weyerhaeuser pulp and paper complex, located
just across the waters and the Mississippi state line. Physically blocking and separating
the residents from access to the plant’s 550 jobs was the Tenn-Tom. In order to get to the
plant, Alabama residents had to travel many miles, either north to Columbus, Mississippi
and back south to the plant, a trip of 40 miles, or south to Macon, Mississippi and back
north, a trip equaling 59 miles. Another alternative for residents was crossing the
waterway “via a rickety, wooden ferry…accessible by a winding gravel road.” Yet, even
this alternative disappeared in 1979, as rising water levels of the Tenn-Tom’s Aliceville
Pool left “residents who worked or conducted business across the river virtually stranded
on the east bank.” 69
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In 1985, the construction of a bridge meant the shortening of the trip to 12 miles
for Alabama residents. A local newspaper reported, “A bridge over the river has long
been a dream for Pickens County leaders, who saw the need for the structure many years
ago in anticipation of growth from the opening of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway.”
The waterway meant to be a tool to connect isolated Mississippi and Alabama counties to
other parts of the nation, required structures like bridges and improved roads to link
surrounding communities to a growing transportation network, plugging them into the
massive network of national and global trade and commerce. A Pickensville business
owner, Jerry Fitch, saw the potential benefits of the bridge to his economically depressed
city. He stated, “Pickensville will be exposed to new areas across the river for the first
time. It is going to open up a different world for them and us.” Another boon aiding the
construction of the bridge was that it shortened the route timber and wood products had
to travel to and from West Alabama and East Mississippi, but despite the benefits of new
bridges and roads to businesses and communities, the primary way to manifest the
waterway’s promise was through building ports, harbors, and marinas on the waterway
itself.70
In 1985, Columbus, Mississippi developers concentrated their efforts on building
a public port. Utilizing an island left open after the straitening of the Tombigbee River,
Columbus used the leftover bend in the old river channel to “provide 7,000 feet of water
frontage at minimal costs.” Columbus took advantage of dredge material created during
the waterway’s construction to build the land of their industrial park site, 177 feet above
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sea level, which was considerably higher than the waterway around it. This brought the
park above the 100-year flood level mark, a measure agreed upon to protect the site from
future harm. Despite this cost cutting technique, the Lowndes County Port Authority still
needed $6.2 million to construct its new facility. The Columbus Port would host new
docking facilities, cranes, and other heavy equipment necessary to conduct river
commerce, as well as provide land for industrial facilities and warehouse space. Such
amenities required tremendous investments from the communities wanting the facilities,
however.71
Raising the funds necessary to complete the port was a monumental task for
Columbus. As a city located in an economically depressed state, local leaders looked for
money from both its local taxpayers, as well as from the state to finance their
developmental efforts. This meant that local developers often turned to their state and
federal leaders for help. In 1985, Henry Weiss, president of the Port Authority in
Columbus recalled one money-raising trip: “We had a good trip to Washington at the end
of April. The most encouragement we got came from Senator John Stennis. He told us
that as far as he was concerned, the Tenn-Tom Waterway would not be complete until
there was a port in Columbus.” Business leaders did not look for all their funding to
come from their home states, however. Columbus placed an application for financing
from the Farmers Home Administration for the sum of $339,000. They also received a
grant of the same size from the Appalachian Regional Commission. Despite developers’
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best interest, the port did not open with the waterway in 1985. After the waterway’s
opening, the city’s Chamber of Commerce Chief, Charleigh Ford assured local people
that, “We have every intention of building a public port at Riverside Industrial Park. I
feel almost certain there will be a port there one way or another.” 72
Still, failure to meet the early opening date of the waterway hindered the city’s
efforts to capitalize on its benefits and hampered the initial fulfillment of the waterway’s
promise. Remarking on this delay, Ford stated, “Obviously, when we get the port
finished, things will be better. You can show people a planned industrial park, but you
really impress them by showing them the actual thing. We have no doubt the port will be
there, but there’s just something about seeing the actual facilities.” The construction of a
port was vital for Columbus, because without it, the city would remain isolated on the
banks of the Tenn-Tom and find itself watching the waterway’s benefits flow to other
communities. Finally completing a port and industrial park in 1986, the city provided
new industries a place to locate. Investors hoped by building proper facilities they would
move to Columbus and provide new jobs to its residents. Cities all along the banks of the
waterway needed to gear their communities for river commerce if they wanted to
participate in the waterway’s promise, a daunting task in an atmosphere lacking financial
wealth. But without facilities, there could be no industries, but meeting the early opening
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date of the waterway with readymade amenities did not guarantee that communities could
or would capitalize on the Tenn-Tom’s promise.73
Only one city met the early completion date of the waterway with a completed
port and industrial facilities, but even its success appeared limited. In June of 1985, the
City of Amory, Mississippi opened the state’s newest harbor by constructing a $2.4
million port on the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. This once booming railroad town
led the charge for expanding its transportation facilities to take advantage of the
waterway. Being the first city to complete the facilities for industrial development
related to the waterway was not Amory’s primary motivation. Rather, concern over
losing its potential benefits due to the accelerated opening date remained the pressing
issue. Amory Mayor Thomas Griffith stated, “I can’t explain our being out in front
except maybe that we worked harder than some folks. We didn’t really try to get ahead.
We were just trying to get ready ourselves.” Believing that in order to truly benefit from
the economic potential of the waterway, Griffith urged both community business leaders
and incoming industries to match the early completion date of the Tenn-Tom. He
remarked, “We didn’t want the boats to toot their horns at us and that be the only benefit
we got from the waterway.” He held to the picturesque promise that the day for another
economic boon was on Amory’s threshold.74
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In 1985, the Tenn-Tom had already proven its potential for benefiting the local
people and business leaders of Amory in their industrial developmental efforts. As the
canal progressed through the region in the early 1980s, the proposed port site benefited
from the same side effect of the waterway’s creation as Columbus. Once a low and
swampy location, the Amory port site was transformed by the construction of the canal
section. Workers dredged material from the waterway onto the city’s property, building
the site above the area’s flood levels. Construction of the port facility became the
culmination of economic efforts between the city of Amory and incoming businesses,
whose arrival marked the city’s move toward water commerce; it also marked
cooperation between the city and the Corps of Engineers. To the leaders of Amory, the
goal was to develop industrial land first, then see which industries showed interest in the
area. Griffith explained their strategy, “We didn’t start out to build a port. We set out to
develop industrial land.”75
In 1977, Amory’s leaders, prompted by the hope of enticing industries to their
planned waterway access point, gambled their economic future and purchased 123 acres
of land from the U.S. Army Core of Engineers. Using the town’s right to eminent
domain, Amory purchased land from local owners along the waterway and then
exchanged it with the Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps needed this land for
waterway construction. The city then traded it for an equal amount of land on the
waterway’s banks benefiting both parties. The city paid between $900 and $1,000 per
acre, $125,000 total. With their commitment to the future of the waterway facilitated,
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Amory waited with heightening anxiety while the lawsuits and lack of government
funding decided the fate of the city’s $125,000 economic wager. Griffith remembered,
“If it hadn’t been completed, we’d be sitting here with 123 acres worth nothing.”76
Even though the future of the waterway was still in question in 1977, Griffith and
other Amory business leaders felt confident that their Congressional delegations would
triumph and ensure its completion, but delayed in committing its money for as long as
possible. With several industries expressing growing interest in the city’s industrial
development, Amory and the U.S. Army Corps settled their financial arrangement in
1983. Working closely together for mutual benefit, Amory and the Corps developed a
friendly business arrangement. Griffith stated, “We dealt with these people for seven
years through word of mouth and never passed a dime.” In 1983, with several factories
expressing their desire to locate to Amory’s industrial sector, the Corps condensed “about
12 months’ work in 30 days” to expedite the bureaucratic processes of land ownership.
When, Weyerhaeuser Company stepped forward with a proposal for a $10 million woodchipping plant, the city started site preparations. Needing local funds to ensure the
industry’s presence in Amory, Griffith turned to the voters for support of a $550,000 city
bond for economic funding needed to construct the adequate infrastructure to meet
Weyerhaeuser’s needs. The people of Amory responded with overwhelmingly support
for the bond, with it winning 89% of the votes.77
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The massive show of support from the voters of Amory reinforced stereotypical
images of the region’s stance in favor of the waterway’s promise and confirmed their
belief in local business leaders efforts to capitalize on it. As Griffith put it, “For people
to support something that strong, that said they were interested in the Tenn-Tom.” At the
backbone of this local effort were business leaders such as E.C. “Cookie” Emerson. His
role in the successful development of Amory’s port was twofold. First, as the former
president of Amory’s Chamber of Commerce, Emerson gained funding for industrial
development with grants for $790,000 from the Economic Development Administration,
$625,000 from the Appalachian Regional Commission, and $338,000 from a Community
Development Block Grant. In a secondary role, Emerson, acting a member of the
TTWDA Board of Directors, looked to promote interest in the waterway throughout the
region. The support network that he could pull from provided the necessary influence to
achieve the goals of the city of Amory, as well as that of the Development Authority and
the state. Emerson claimed, “It was just a heckuva lot of people going after this thing.
We never let them [the waterway’s opposition] rest. If they shut one door on us we’d go
to another one.” Basking in the confidence provided by the support of the voters and
local business leaders, Emerson felt that many individuals saw the Tenn-Tom as the
economic “salvation of northeast Mississippi.” He continued, “I’m sold on the thing and
I’ll say about 99 percent of the people are.”78
Potential industries interested in utilizing the Tenn-Tom saw benefits in moving
to Amory. In addition to Weyerhaeuser’s facility, Tom Soya Grain Company built a
78
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$700,000 grain terminal and dock in Amory. Vice president of the company Ray Lucas
said, “It has a hard surface road, a railroad, and water.” With access to three out of four
transportation means, Amory looked to be an ideal location for the new industry. For
lumber industries, like Weyerhaeuser, the Tenn-Tom “essentially paved a toll-free
highway from the southern woods all the way to the Far East, making previously
landlocked forests as accessible and convenient as McDonalds’s.” These examples
seemed to prove that the Tenn-Tom was linking isolated rural communities to the wider
global market, but gaining businesses using the waterway did not spell automatic
success.79
With all the advantages Amory experienced over other communities along the
waterway, the town expected to benefit from the waterway’s promise from the very start.
However, reality quickly staunched much of these good feelings. In 1985, the two new
industries locating to the town brought in only a handful of jobs. The Tom Soya terminal
created only six new jobs. The Weyerhaeuser wood chipping facility provided twentytwo full time workers and about three times as many support personnel gained
employment. In all, Amory gained a roughly a hundred new jobs from the waterway that
year. These numbers were very different from the economic promise expected with the
coming of the Tenn-Tom and fell well short of the expectations of local citizens and
business leaders.80
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For a city located in one of the poorest regions of America, paying $550,000 to
attract fewer than a hundred jobs at Weyerhaeuser was not the realization of the promise
they expected. Incensed locals, who felt that all of the Tenn-Tom’s promises were
becoming thinly veiled lies, looked back at the promised figures in the promotional
literature supplied from regional developers. In 1985, a local newspaper quoted the
preliminary figures expected with the coming of the waterway. In 1977, the Appalachian
Regional Commission predicted the project would bring in 135,000 new jobs with
personal income and private investment jumping $2.9 billion by the year 2000. While
Amory was just one city looking to gain jobs from the Tenn-Tom, as the leading city in
the Tenn-Tom development arena, this meager gain did not reflect well on the potential
job making of future industries and the promise of the waterway appeared to be
crumbling under its expectations.81
Despite the mediocre growth in jobs, Mayor Griffith was optimistic during the
waterway’s first year of operation. From the very beginning of the town’s experience
with commerce along the Tenn-Tom, Griffith dismissed the mythical promises that the
waterway was to be a “bonanza for any town” or a “California Gold Rush.” Griffith’s
words suggested that during the first years of business along the Tenn-Tom, there
remained an ideological difference between the economic expectations of the local
populaces and the reality of the type of industries that would come to utilize the
waterway. Local populations seemed exasperated by the lack of jobs produced by TennTom industries. For populaces familiar with the labor-intensive textile industries of their
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recent past, the high capital and material costs, but low job production of waterway
commerce was shocking. The large and expensive machinery needed for wood chipping
and grain storage facilities for instance, meant building new expensive infrastructures for
incoming industries, a cost that local communities had to share in order to entice new
forms of commerce into their areas. For the cash-strapped communities along the
waterway’s shores, construction of ports and the waterway itself, despite their already
large investments, were not enough to guarantee that businesses would come.
Communities had to offer other incentives such as building facilities or tax breaks to
entice industrial expansion into the region.
The waterway’s leading bulk commodities of lumber, oil, and coal, exports large
in tonnage, did not translate into a large number of jobs. Moreover, these shipments were
of largely raw materials, which demanded less labor from the region than processed ones.
Expressing concern along this line was Thomas “Bud” Phillips, Columbus-Lowndes
Industrial Foundation President, who stated in 1985:
While I recognize the Tenn-Tom as a major artery for forest products, I
am a bit disturbed that we are shipping raw materials out of Mississippi.
Our efforts are and will continue to be to have the wood products
manufactured into finished products before being shipped from our
community. If you export finished products, you’re making more jobs,
and that’s a prime task of the industrial foundation. In the meantime, I
realize we will have to take advantage of the raw material market.82
With little knowledge into the background of the new types of industries
expressing interest in the Tenn-Tom, the people of Northeast Mississippi seemed
unprepared for the lack of employment opportunities. Griffith warned, “We’re
82
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confronted with dealing with a populace that is used to industry that is labor intensive.”
After decades of dedication to the Tenn-Tom, communities wanted instant gratification in
the form of hundreds of jobs, not just the handfuls that were manifesting. When jobs
failed to manifest themselves, the specter of doubt grew in the back of the populace’s
minds. They appeared to ask, is this all? Was this the culmination of the decades of
promises, struggles and bitter litigations? In the first year of operation in 1985, the
mayor of Amory remained firm in the belief that the Tenn-Tom would “eventually boost
the economy of northeast Mississippi.” He prophesied, “We spent the first 100 years of
our life as a railroad town. We’ll spend the rest of our life as a railroad and waterway
town.”83
Yet despite Griffith’s cautious words of patience and beliefs of a better day to
come, many business leaders quickly became impatient with the lack of economic growth
in their areas. After only a single year of grappling with economic shortcomings, Mayor
Griffith and Amory’s local business leaders started expressing their growing sense of
exasperation and those of the local populaces, who failed to see any impending growth in
jobs from waterway industries. Griffith admitted to a local newspaper, “We’ve all
experienced some changing times…projections in reality just didn’t fit. The waterway
was billed to be an economic development tool, and it still has that potential. But it’s not
going to be the Utopia we all thought it was.” These words seemed to spell the end of the
waterway’s promise, but in actuality, Griffith was only bemoaning the early
shortcomings of the waterway. Individuals, like Griffith, were falling victim to the
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waterway’s towering promise of economic salvation, which unfortunately left them
vulnerable to the uncertain economic eddies of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway.
Not long after the waters started flowing, business leaders and local populations began
looking for the promised benefits. When it became apparent that they were not
materializing people began to rush to judgments. What failed was patience. After the
long years of debates and construction, people failed to hold off their interpretation of the
waterway before it had time to develop.84
While in the years leading up to the waterway’s opening the TTWDA’s labors
kept local industrial efforts varied and noncompetitive, it failed to help most communities
match the accelerated completion date. Without ports, ships and industries had nowhere
to conduct their business. By the time some communities constructed their facilities; the
window of industrial interest had closed. However, even having ready facilities did not
always spell developmental success. During the first two years of operation, the
industries that appeared on the Tenn-Tom were more interested in the region’s raw
materials, not its cheap labor source. The small gain in jobs crushed the early celebratory
spirit of waterway’s supporters during this time and some began to turn their backs on the
waterway’s promise as an economic bonanza. At the same time, communities began
questioning whether the Tenn-Tom’s shortcomings were a natural progression one
necessary for the progression of the Tenn-Tom’s promise, or a truer reflection of its
image as a boondoggle of tremendous proportions. In 1986, Griffith continued
lambasting his belief in the long-term promise of the Tenn-Tom. He lamented, “I would
84
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swap this bugger any day for an interstate highway.” For the supposed “Railroad Capital
of the South,” as Amory once proudly proclaimed itself, a change in outlook was
underway again. “You’ve got to haul it [industry] by truck down a road,” Griffith
continued. “Towns grow on highways, not railways and waterways.” This was a truly
ironic statement considering the city’s origins and Griffith’s earlier beliefs in the
waterway’s promise.85
In terms of economic success in the opening years, critics labeled the waterway a
colossal disaster. In the first year of operation, the Tenn-Tom shipped only 1.7 million
tons of cargo. This measured only 6-percent of the 27 million tons of shipments
predicted to travel through the waterway in its first year of operation. In a January 1987
editorial, the Washington Post called the project “the nation’s largest wet elephant.”
Criticizing the waterway’s output the editors wrote, “the waterway has provided passage
for only 4.8 million tons of cargo in almost its first two years of operation, and a fifth of
that was stone for its own banks.” In an effort to explain to cynics why the waterway was
not progressing as fast as many thought that it should, Don Waldon, Administer of the
TTWDA, supplied, “I think the waterway is being completed at a time when the economy
is in poor shape, especially for exports and coal.” Coal in particular was a vital
component figured into the cost-benefit ratio of the waterway. Yet in the first year of
operation, the Tenn-Tom recorded only 500,000 tons of coal traffic, falling well short of
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the predicted rate of 17 million tons. Waldon continued, “We couldn’t have opened at a
worse time, but on balance, we think that everything is coming along real well. I’m not
saying it will take 50 years, but we have to realize it’ll take a few years for this waterway
to mature.”86
The Development Authority knew that when the waterway first opened, barge
traffic was going to be “slow in coming.” Another member of the Development
Authority, Assistant Administer Darlene Scogin explained their expectations of waterway
traffic: “I don’t expect them [barges] to be lining up at the locks to use it.” The early
opening date conflicted with most shippers’ agendas as they were locked into preexisting
contracts. Another consideration was the newness of the waterway itself. Riverboat
pilots clung to a long existing belief in having personal knowledge of the rivers they
traveled. They formed closely-knit communities and swapped tales about trouble spots
along America’s water systems. The novelty of the Tenn-Tom was that they had to learn
abut the system, search out its flow, scout its waters and get a feel for traveling along its
channels. This would help them determine the most efficient and economical barge
configurations used along the waterway and how to avoid any trouble spots. This was
just another process that would take time for industries to work through.87
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While numbers tell one story, economic development specialist, Joseph Birindelli
offered an alternative explanation. In 1986, he stated that, “the barge traffic shouldn’t be
expected to be there yet.” Birindelli preached patience when looking at the waterway’s
benefits. “It takes time,” he explained, “The economic picture has changed in 10 years.”
This theory was simple in approach, but in actuality, no economic expert could accurately
predict the path that the economy would follow next. Construction started during the
energy crisis of the 1970s and experts predicted that the rising energy prices would
increase the demand for coal. By the time the waterway opened in 1985, national
concerns had turned to other worries and the coal bonanza never materialized. A victim
of drooping foreign markets in coal, lumber, grain and other bulk shipments, the TennTom’s opening coincided with a change in the global economy. With an emphasis for
American exports heading to Southeast Asia, the Tenn-Tom linked to the wrong ocean.
This impact would lesson in later years with the creation of the North Atlantic Free Trade
Agreement trade block, when the agreement opened up parts of Latin America to more
prodigious trading and as Asian companies grew more interested in the chip wood
coming out of southern forests.88
Despite the lack of traffic flowing through the Tenn-Tom’s waters during the first
couple of years, waterway supporters looked at its success in different terms than
tonnage. In 1986, Pat Ross, Assistant Director of the TTWDA, claimed the potential of
the waterway to the future of the distressed regions of Alabama and Mississippi was just
as important as the amount of cargo it was shipping. At a Senate hearing that year, she
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argued that the Tenn-Tom was “no boondoggle.” Ross stated, “Up to now, people in this
part of Alabama and Mississippi have lived in depressed circumstances, emotionally and
economically. The waterway at least holds out the hope of industrial and economic
development. You can’t just look at the tonnage.” She continued, “Part of the problem is
that we finished two years ahead of schedule, so that some industries and companies have
been slow to invest in loading and unloading facilities.” Ross and others predicted that in
time, as new industries located along the waterway and came into use, tonnage in the
form of their exports would increase accordingly. For developers, the hope of the TennTom was just as important as its promise. With the waterway built and as long as it was
maintained, poor and depressed southerners had a chance at economic salvation. This
thinking was different from the promise built during the years of construction. In the first
years after its opening, waterway supporters changed from endorsing it as a promise and
adopted it as an emblem of hope. To them, the Tenn-Tom became a key promotional tool
for the future development of the region, and its potential benefits in the years to follow
were as important as any actual jobs created in the early years. At the same time,
construction of the Tenn-Tom meant that southern leaders were no longer accepting the
South’s wayward economic past. They would do whatever it took to give the South the
economic shot in the arm it desperately needed. With the waterway built, it now meant
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the formation of an important framework and all that remained was for future businesses
to build upon this new foundation of trade, commerce, and industry. Despite harsh
criticism and poor initial figures, Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway’s promise seemed
accessible to southerners willing to give it time to mature.89
Believing in the long-term benefits of the waterway, the TTWDA continued to
support development along its reaches. Sticking to their early plan of not leaving the full
socio-economic benefits of the region to happenstance, the Development Authority
undertook aggressive marketing schemes. As the primary supporters of the project after
its opening, they held firm in their conviction that the waterway’s merits would withstand
the test of time. Through assertive advertising and marketing, the Development
Authority promoted the waterway as an atmosphere ripe for development. They stood
undaunted by the initial poor showings of the waterway’s commerce and resolutely stood
by its merits. Confirming their belief, the Tenn-Tom saw a steady increase in tonnage
during the first fifteen years of its operation (See Table 1). However, the tonnage figures
remained well below those predicted during the waterway’s construction, which forecast
that the Tenn-Tom would ship 28 million tons in 1986, 32.3 million in 1990, and 44.7 by
2000. Compared to its real figures, flowing through its waters, this was a huge disparity,
but supporters pointed to other benefits of the waterway in order to explain and mitigate
its tonnage shortcoming.90
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Table 1
History of Tonnage Flowing on the Tenn-Tom from 1985-1999.91

Year
1985
1986
1987
1988*
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Total

Tonnage
1,701,431
3,650,361
4,099,780
9,920,393
5,168,192
4,694,867
5,225,949
6,393,491
7,662,080
7,905,068
8,702,371
8,931,466
9,154,222
9,313,514
8,927,008
101,450,193

One shining example of this was that the waterway showed remarkable resilience
in being virtually drought-proof. Over the years, as other shipping routes in the U.S.
experienced blockages due to “weather, manmade, or natural disasters,” the TTWDA
bragged, “the Tenn-Tom’s well engineered 10 locks and dams and regulated channel
depths keep vital commerce flowing.” This was evident in the summer of 1988, when a
severe drought forced shippers along the upper Mississippi and Ohio River Valleys to
seek alternatives to the shallower and poorly navigable Mississippi River. Major General
91
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Robert M. Bunker stated, “The importance and vitality of the waterway was reinforced
during the drought this past year. Low water levels on the Mississippi forced shippers to
seek alternative routes to deep ports. The Tenn-Tom Waterway, with stable water depths,
proved to be a valuable asset to the nation.” This created a bonanza year for the
waterway and confirmed it as an added bonus to the nation’s economy in the event of a
disaster. Alabama State Docks Director John B. Dutton echoed this sentiment saying, “In
fact, the waterway was the only dependable barge route to the U.S. Gulf for most of the
summer. This is a time for us to showcase our facilities, what we can do, and what the
Tenn-Tom can do.” Long time supporter of the project, Alabama Representative, Tom
Bevill remarked that the waterway “paid for itself twice” by 1989. He argued the first
time was when the waterway’s opened and railroad companies reduced their rates “in fear
of competition.” The second occurred during the 1988 drought when “the waterway
saved many companies from folding.” Bevill bragged, “So that old pork-barrel project’s
doing pretty good.” He remarked that that some businesses “were able to stay in business
because the Tenn-Tom was there as an alternative route.” While several businesses
claimed that they survived the drought of 1989, because of the waterway, it remains very
questionable whether these savings were enough to compensate for it expenses to
taxpayers. With construction costs equaling $1.96 billion combined with the millions of
dollars spent in maintenance and operation costs over the years the waterway’s price tag
was climbing. It seems unlikely a single year of alleviating restricted the restricted flow
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of barge traffic on the Mississippi River and a reduction of railroad shipping costs hardly
seem to compensate for its expenditures.92
Still experts began finding other ways in which people began to benefit from
using the waterway. Shippers using the Tenn-Tom the year of the drought also
discovered another huge advantage in utilizing the waterway on return trips. Empty
barges began to ply the slack waters of the waterway and enjoyed reduced fuel costs in
their return trips home back north into the heartland of America. In fact, many barges of
commerce ship down the Mississippi River, but return via the Tenn-Tom avoiding the
same currents they utilized on the way south. While these carriers do not reflect in the
tonnage figures of the waterway, they contribute to reduced operating costs, lower
transportation fees, thus providing benefits to the welfare of the nation.93
According to supporters of the waterway, another added benefit of the Tenn-Tom
was the one resource abundantly found within its shore. In 1988, Mississippi legislature
passed House Bill 1307 solving a growing crisis for Tupelo, Mississippi, the largest
urban center within the waterway’s corridor. The bill enabled all municipalities within
the Tupelo region to draw their principal water collectively from the waterway. Before
this legislation, Tupelo faced a shortage of water, limiting any potential growth for the
city as the aquifer that supplied their water was being depleted by the city’s demand.
Harry Martin, President Emeritus of the Tupelo Community Development Foundation
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declared, “You’ve got to have water for growth.” From 1988 to 2000, Martin attributed
an increase of 14, 376 jobs to the city because of the new wellspring of water provided by
the Tenn-Tom. The significant increase of jobs in Tupelo seemed to confirm what
experts were clamed from the beginning, that tonnage did not always reflect the
waterway’s benefits to the region.94
As for industrialization along the Tenn-Tom, according to the TTW Authority
itself, in fifteen years, the waterway created over $4 billion of new and expanded
industrial development. This was a large sum of outside money coming into the region,
providing financial aid to depressed regions. In addition, most of these industries were
heavy manufacturing operations that benefited from large volume barge traffic and they
employed skilled labor, which demanded higher salaries than traditional industrial and
textile jobs of the region. This contributed to not only more jobs, but also a higher
standard of living for the employees of waterway industries. 95
By the mid-1990s, supporters of the waterway could even point to figures that
would belie the growing belief that the waterway was an economic flop. In a short film
made for public broadcasting, the TTWDA showcased the benefits of the waterway.
Tim Weston, Director of Port Itawamba located in Fulton, Mississippi claimed:
We have seen nearly $4 billion dollars of capital investment in new and
expanded industries and nearly 50,000 new jobs. Many of these new
companies [are] located in historically economic[ally] distressed rural
communities, bringing in new companies, jobs, and hope. The TTW has
allowed our region to diversify its industrial base, being largely
responsible for the recruitment for companies like Boeing, International
94
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Paper, Weyerhaeuser, Kerr-McGee Chemical and Leggin and Flak.
Without the Tenn-Tom it‘s not likely that these companies would have
located in out area. [It] brought more jobs, better jobs, and a higher
quality of life for our people.
In an economic study done in 1995, Economic Analysts from Troy State University and
the University of West Alabama found that the waterway contributed millions of dollars
to the local, regional and national economies and provided thousands of jobs during the
five-year period from 1990 to 1994. Calculating the direct, indirect (income and jobs
created because of purchases made by firms using the waterway), and induced (income
expenditures of employees gaining jobs created by access to the waterway both direct and
indirect) impacts of jobs and compensation, the study showed a remarkable growth (See
table 2). The single largest employer of the waterway was the wood and wood products
industry, which accounted for eighty percent of the waterways workers.96

Table 2
Summary of the Total Economic Impact of Waterway in 1994.97
Jobs
18,867
22,275
43,222

Immediate Area
Four-State Area
National

Compensation ($million)
484.5
583.8
1,164.5

Contradictions between the perceptions of the supporters and detractors of the
fulfillment of the Tenn-Tom’s promise clouded people’s opinion. For some the realities
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never lived up to their expectations. To others it was only a matter of time before the
promise cultivated and placed all exasperations by the weigh side. Hollie Allen, the
director of the University of North Alabama’s Industrial Research and Extension Center
explained her outlook on the Tenn-Tom: “I never thought the Tenn-Tom was going to be
a rip-roaring explosion. I remain confident that growth is going to occur and that will
generate tonnage. We’ve only scratched the surface to this point with a little
development here and there.” Different factors combined to hamper the fulfillment of the
Teenn-Tom’s promise to the people of Mississippi and Alabama. Mounting expectations,
an early opening date, changes in the global economy, and the difficulties of building the
necessary auxiliaries businesses needed to conduct there business, all played a part in
fulfilling the waterway’s promise. In 1989, TTWDA President Don Waldon stated:
Debate on major public policy issues, such as the Tenn-Tom, evoke honest
differences of opinions on the pros and cons of these kinds of projects.
With the exception of some interests outside the Tenn-Tom region, the
vast majority of those affected by this waterway are strong supporters of
the project. Tenn-Tom has always enjoyed bipartisan support of the
region’s elected officials. Not one governor from the five-state region of
the waterway has ever opposed the waterway. Every congressman and
senator from the Tenn-Tom corridor have always supported the project
primarily because of the strong grass-roots support the project enjoyed.
Can all of these people be wrong? I doubt it.98
People’s expectations, their exasperations, their countless hopes and dreams, all
dealt with progress and when progress did not manifest from the start with the Tenn-Tom
that is when their thoughts changed. That’s when the promise changed and that’s when
people began forming their own ideals about what the promise meant. No sooner had the
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water started flowing, then the critics of the waterway started constructing its view as a
failure. Soon after, local people began to see the Tenn-Tom in the same light. They
didn’t give it time to mature. They rushed their interpretation and who could blame
them? After the decades of living with the promise of the waterway, when were they
expected to benefit from it? People from all walks of life turned away from the belief of
the waterway as the economic salvation of the region. However, consciously or not, they
began turning to its other resources to gain some improvements in their life.
As developers along the Tenn-Tom struggled to transform the economies and
economic path of one of the poorest regions of America, a real transformation was
happening in an unlikely place. As businessman and women encouraged industrial
growth in the various communities located on the shores of the Tenn-Tom, an old rival
from the years of construction was providing influences of its own. The natural
environment and the environmental considerations put forth by NEPA were sparking an
alternative interpretation within the minds of some local people in the Tenn-Tom
region.99
With its official opening in 1985, the Tenn-Tom opened its waters to “anyone
who wants to use it.” Taking the waterway up on its offer, many pedestrian-owned
watercrafts flocked to the nation’s newest waterway. Looking to explore a part of the
country closed to water traffic before the creation of the Tenn-Tom, these boaters saw
first hand the scenic beauty of northeast Mississippi and southwest Alabama. This influx
of pleasure crafts caught many of the local business leaders off guard by their sheer
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numbers, leaving many communities to grapple with new efforts on how to capitalize on
this new form of traffic. The environment was adding its voice to the interpretation of
the waterway’s promise, but this time as an ally. In the years following the opening of
the waterway, the natural environment and the changes to the land of Mississippi and
Alabama offered some an alternative salvation. Cookie Emerson, member of Amory’s
Chamber of Commerce, remained a perceptive business leader for his town and the
TTWDA. Emerson was one of the few who predicted that recreational activities could
bring profits to the economies of the local communities. In 1985, he stated, “When
you’ve got fishermen, campers, and everybody coming in here, even the man selling
snow cones on the corners will benefit.” Yet despite his recognition, the recreational
exploits of the Tenn-Tom caught many communities unaware of its true potential for
changing currents of thoughts. 100
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CHAPTER IV
THE PROMISE THAT IS: THE TALE OF TWO RIVERS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGACY OF THE WATERWAY, AND RECREATION

In August of 1988, Lakeland Boating, a magazine dedicated to covering the
navigational interests of freshwater boating enthusiasts from the Great Lakes and its
connecting waterways, dedicated an article to the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway.
Entitled “The Incredible Tenn-Tom,” the author, William Prentiss, proclaimed,
“Midwestern boaters eager to reach the Gulf of Mexico and warmer climates will find a
great new shortcut on the Tenn-Tom.” Describing the Tenn-Tom as a “Waterway
Wilderness,” Prentiss was joined on his sojourn by Gene Agnew a boater familiar with
waters of both the Mississippi and the Tenn-Tom. Agnew expressed his opinion of the
advantages of traveling on the Tenn-Tom instead of the Mississippi River. High seas,
rough water, and heavy commercial traffic made journeying on the Mississippi with
pleasure boats an arduous task. Remarking about his three journeys along the Tenn-Tom,
Agnew stated, “You could probably run it at a good cruising speed in a little more than a
couple of days, but we enjoy the scenery and the water.” Another difference on the
Tenn-Tom was barge traffic or more importantly their ability to control their loads.
Again, Agnew explained some difficulties of navigating the Mississippi River over the
Tenn-Tom: “We were in a narrow place when I spotted this towboat approaching.
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Remember, a towboat is really a pusher, and the captain’s control over his load is
affected by wind and current. I called him to ask which side of the channel he would
prefer. He was back to me in a couple of seconds. He said, ‘Captain you can either go
on the bank or outside the buoy line because I’m taking the whole channel.’ Needless to
say, I got out of the way. I haven’t heard of any such problems on the Tenn-Tom. The
towboats have good control over their barges because the Tenn-Tom is a ‘slack water
stream.’ That is, it barely moves.” However, travel along the Tenn-Tom offered
obstacles of a different and smaller sort.101
Midwestern boaters were not the only watercraft to visit the waterway in large
numbers. Anglers from all over the country flocked to its waters in search of bass,
crappie, white perch, and other fish, and the Tenn-Tom quickly developed a national
reputation as a “hotspot” for fishermen. It produced state records and corporate
sponsored bass tournaments. Captain Daniel Webster, another midwestern yacht cruiser,
commented on the number of fishing boats he encountered in his travels. He said,
“Sometimes you can run into two hundred in a day.” Together, the combination of large
and small recreation craft floating on the Tenn-Tom meant that new traffic rules and
regulations were necessary, requiring travelers to remain respectful of one another.
During his journey Agnew commented about the situation saying, “The northern section
have a lot of small boat traffic—mostly fishermen. The rule is watch the wake.” In fact
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boating safety became a large concern of the Corps and local law enforcement agencies
all along the waterway.102
Ease of travel and safety issues were only considerations for midwestern boaters
journeying through Alabama’s and Mississippi’s new water system. In another article
detailing the Tenn-Tom’s naturalness, another Midwestern boater commented on his
travels. James T. Swartzwelder, a pilot for the Gateway Clipper Fleet said, “It’s a
beautiful waterway and a nice alternate route for pleasure boaters.” A third Midwestern
visitor, Donna Caruso, summed up her experience as follows: “While a notation I spotted
on one chart may be true—that ‘you will become so attached to the Tenn-Tom Waterway
that you will want your ashes scattered there,’—the waterway does hold its own brand of
beauty. As we snaked down the Mississippi and Alabama borders, gray cranes constantly
flew across our path, deer and even an alligator turned up on the shores once we got
further south. We admired an array of waterfalls created from the dams at the locks as
well as craggy coves of cypress stumps, eight rivers that enter into the waterway, and
some very southern tourist sites.” The splendors of the southern environment were on
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display to these visitors and the visual “naturalness” of the waterway’s design was
turning out to be another factor drawing people to the region.103
Recognizing the draw nature was having in attracting people, boosters began to
advertise these added cultural advantages to people inside and outside of the project area.
Local newspapers wrote of the native recreational and cultural resource benefits and
began constructing a new charming personality for the Tenn-Tom. These papers wanted
to personify the waterway as a place where one would want to experience the nature,
history, and culture of the Tombigbee Valley. One example of this occurred in March,
1986, when Columbus, Mississippi’s The Commercial Dispatch carried an article saying:
”the waterway has thousands of acres of water ready and waiting for you to enjoy.
Experience the serenity of the park’s surroundings, but please do not pinch the turkeys or
ride the deer.” Embellishments, such as the example above, sculpted a different
interpretation of the waterway’s purpose, one significantly different from its industrial
roots.104
From its opening in 1985, there were many attractions drawing numerous
recreational boaters to the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway’s shores. First, many boater
enjoyed the benefits of reduced mileage in reaching America’s Gulf Coast. This was
especially important for large number of boaters traveling to and from the Great Lakes as
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they were able to avoid the heavy commercial barge traffic found on the lower
Mississippi. In addition, they enjoyed lowered fuel costs through shortened journeys to
Florida and other popular vacation spots throughout the Caribbean. For those located
closer to the waterway, the new lakes built behind the Tenn-Tom’s numerous locks and
dams created large bodies of water where none existed before. These offered nearby
fishing grounds and a myriad of opportunities for locals to enjoy water sports and
activities of all sorts. The Tenn-Tom also offered recreational visitors better aesthetic
conditions because it was designed with environmental considerations in mind. Visitors
quickly discovered that the waterway was “nicely bordered on both sides with woods and
low hills, few houses, towns, or signs of industry,” a more “natural” setting than that
experienced along the Mississippi and other rivers.105
While this description of the Tenn-Tom was not the promised economic portrayal
that developers envisioned, it does suggest that there was an alternative way of living
with the realities of the booster’s original promises. During the first ten years of the
waterway’s operation, local communities began gearing their economic interests to
include ways of capitalizing on this new influx of outside traffic flowing by their shores.
Through these additional efforts, people began to realize the unforeseen benefits in
having the waterway in their region. Through these years of development, recreational
facilities and opportunities of the Tenn-Tom increased the quality of life throughout the
region, offering them additions to the South’s cultural resources. While the grandiose
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predictions of commercial river traffic and job opportunities of the Tenn-Tom’s promise
remained elusive, slowly rising figures gave some reason for optimism. In the mean
time, communities began enjoying the benefits of more than just jobs and industry
coming from the waterway and flocked to its woods and shores to partake in the TennTom’s abundance of leisure activities and they were not alone.
In 1988, the Corps of Engineers reported that their locking facilities were
operating at maximum capacity, but it was not commercial traffic filling their locks. That
same year, the TTWDA reported that the five million visitors, almost twice the number
predicted by the experts, were visiting the Tenn-Tom. Privately owned yachts, sailboats,
and houseboats of tremendous size and even ocean going cruise ships “up to 180 feet
long” sailed the waterway in increasing numbers. At first, the novelty of the Tenn-Tom
played a large part in this transit recreational traffic, but visitation remained steady over
the years. Throughout the 1990s, in spring and fall at least a hundred boats a month
migrated from the north or south and many boaters sailed the waterway for the cultural
and natural attractions it offers, utilizing it as more than just a transportation corridor.
The recreation arena beckoned developers who started seeing another opportunity for
locals to cash in on the waterway’s promise. In 1988, searching for new businesses
interested locating to the Tenn-Tom for its recreational aspects, Pat Ross, TTWDA
assistant administrator, said, “We believe there is excellent opportunity for marinas and
other facilities to serve boaters, camper, and fishermen, and we welcome inquiries.”
Predictions were that more pleasure boat traffic would soon flow into the Tenn-Tom,
brining outside money into the region. Ross continued, “Our lockmaster counted quite a
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lot of full-size motor yachts (in excess of 35 feet) making the full run through the system
in 1987. These craft were all registered in states other than Alabama and Mississippi.”106
There was never any doubt that millions of people would come to visit the
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, but few expected them to come in the numbers that
they did. Prior to its construction, the best estimates predicted three million visitors
would come to enjoy the hunting, fishing, boating, swimming, and camping experiences
provided by the waterway’s recreational facilities. These numbers greatly
underestimated the appeal of the Tenn-Tom as the numbers would soon double these
figures. During construction, environmental considerations caused developers and the
Corps countless hardships and placed numerous hurdles for them to overcome. Adopting
tactics to “protect and enhance” the environment, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
underwent a change in policy during the “age of the environment.” Throughout the
Tenn-Tom corridor, the Corps made radical changes to the shape, character, and identity
of the natural landscapes in Northeast Mississippi and Western Alabama.107
While controversial at the time, the environmental tactics and strategies forced
upon the waterway by NEPA and the two court cases implemented a new future for the
Tombigbee Valley. In essence, these considerations created an environment that was
both bountiful and beautiful, with both economic and environmental consequences in
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mind. In the years after the waterway’s opening, the Corps continued adopting
innovative ways of increasing its recreational appeal. At the same time that the Corps
and boosters built ports and industrial parks, they also groomed the Tenn-Tom’s waters to
be excellent fishing grounds. They also planted forests to provide habitat for a diversity
of wildlife, and provided recreational facilities and opportunities for people to enjoy and
learn not only about the project itself, but the region’s environment and history as well.
Adopting strategies that would enhance the waterway’s appeal to a variety of people, the
Corps created a project that integrated itself into the culture of the region and built a
future where people, economics, and the environment coalesced into a new promise.
From the beginning, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway promised the region
economic stimulation by bringing jobs and industry into a region in need of both. At
another level, the Tenn-Tom also promised a lot more. To a select few, the fulfillment of
the waterway’s promise went beyond the limited amount of jobs it provided. They saw
the other ways it began to improve the quality of life of local people. New recreational
opportunities allowed countless individuals both inside and outside the region a way of
experiencing and enjoying the waterway, nature, and the region’s history. These
activities touched more people’s lives in ways beyond what simple economics could.
People swam, fished, and boated on its waters. They hiked, camped, and hunted its
lands, and in the process they spent money. They bought boats, gas, food, and supplies,
creating new economic opportunities for local communities. All of this was done in the
name of the Tenn-Tom.
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The environmental changes forced upon the Tenn-Tom became advantages in the
years after its opening. It benefited both man and wildlife by intertwining industrial
development with recreational pursuits. It accomplished this by altering the land, but
also by altering its promise. Reflecting changes in the way people were thinking about
the environment and spurred by new federal legislation, in the ten years after its opening
the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway embraced an environmental legacy. Its supporters
argued that despite its controversial beginnings, the waterway was nature personified.
While there was some environmental damage caused by its construction, in many cases,
the waterway created an “enhanced” environment. The Tenn-Tom mitigated damages to
land hurt not only by its construction, but through years of poor land husbandry as well
and transformed them for the benefit of local environments and economics. This
transformation started with changes to the land of the Tombigbee Valley, a conversion
that takes hundreds of years of explanation in order to understand. By tracing the
changes in the land from earliest history of the region and the two rivers of the project,
one can understand how the environment and economic combined to make the promise
that is.
The creation of the Tennessee and Tombigbee Rivers dates back to prehistoric
times. Isolated by a drainage divide of crustaceous-period terraces, both the two father
rivers of the waterway and the inhabitants of these river valleys progressed along
paralleling, but contrasting paths. The grandfather river of this system is the Tennessee,
which has historically played a more significant role in America history. From native
cultures to early European settlement and finally to its modern image, the Tennessee by
104

its sheer length, size, and resources dominated riverine customs throughout much of the
South. The Tombigbee, while smaller in length and water volume, remained significant
to transportation traffic due to its conveyance with the Black Warrior River to the east
and eventually the Gulf of Mexico to the south. For some American Indians and early
European settlers, the Tombigbee was a more convenient route to the coast than that
taken by the Tennessee. Despite their separation, the two river valleys harbored similar
cultures, agricultural pursuits, and even conflicts. While the fate of the Tennessee River
at the hands of the TVA is well chronicled by historians, the fate of the Tombigee is less
documented even though they share the common legacy of being harnessed by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.108
In the cases of both the Tennessee and Tombigbee Rivers, the sacrifice of the old
rivers facilitated their resurrection as a single modern navigable water system. While the
change of these two rivers from old to new is not necessarily remarkable in American
river lore, they provide two poignant looks at the ideals fostered in their transformation
by man’s hands. The first was the promise of economic salvation fostered through
connecting impoverished regions of the South to the rest of the nation through advanced
water infrastructure. The second was the transition of old free flowing river to a newly
regulated and controlled waterway, an “enhanced” environment that would bring a
myriad of benefits and provide social uplifting. These changes to the land altered the
navigability of the rivers and reshaped their environmental character. Throughout the
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twentieth century, the federal government reshaped the landscape of America into one
more befitting an industrialized nation. Roads, rails, and waterways connected the nation
into a collective organism capable of sustaining its exterior international requirements
with the pulse of its interior machinations. While in the centuries before the twentieth,
man tamed the land with axes, plows, and fences, in the modern era they used massive
earthmoving machinery like bulldozers and excavators built with the uncompromising
strength of steel and concrete, and operated under the erudite supervision of engineers
and scientists. These experts, armed with superior knowledge and technology, so
radically changed the landscape of America that when people paused and looked around,
they hardly recognized their surroundings.
In 1946, historian Donald Davidson remarked that the Tennessee River was in
fact “two rivers in one.” The first, hidden in the undercurrents of the other, was the river
of old, which Davidson named the river of “legend.” Drowned beneath the Tennessee
River of today, it is lost to all but the fond memories of a dieing few or immortalized on
the pages of numerous books. In earlier times, this veiled Tennessee River was wild and
unpredictable; it defied attempts to harness it for thousands of years. Formed with the
departure of the crustaceous sea that covered much of the inland of the North America,
the Tennessee River disregarded the common logic associated with the majority of rivers
east of the Mississippi. The Tennessee distinguished itself from other rivers of the
region by its sheer length and the erratic path it followed while crossing through much of
the south. Springing out from its headwaters in the Appalachians to the east, the
Tennessee flowed generally in a southwestern direction, until it reached Muscle Shoals,
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Alabama, where it turned west and then surged northwestwardly, the reverse of its
original southerly course. Running as far north as south, the Tennessee eventually meets
up with the Ohio River near modern day Kentucky. Its waters ultimately mix with the
Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico.109
Throughout its course, many hazards and obstacles thwarted human navigation
along the river. Would-be boat pilots called these fear-inspiring navigational hazards
“the suck,” “the narrows,” and “Muscle Shoals.” Changing unpredictably from a wide
river with slow moving waters to narrow pinched areas full of rapids and shallow shoals,
travel on the river was at best a dangerous task and simply impossible for many more.
However, transportation problems ended with the coming of the New Deal legislation of
the 1930s or more importantly its brainchild the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).
Under their machinations, the old Tennessee River of legend shed its physical body and
transcended into the intangible realm of memories and dreams, a fate that its little
brother, the Tombigbee, would share forty years later.110
The second river of Davidson’s narrative is the manmade river systems of today’s
Tennessee River known as the “river of statistics.” A colossal wonder of the world,
constructed through the expertise, ingenuity and imagination of man. Like Disney’s
“imagineers” diligently working to create a realistic fantasy environment for millions of
park visitors, the TVA conjured up and sculpted a new river more compatible with their
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idealized vision of the wants and needs of modern man. Today, more a chain of lakes
than a river, the Tennessee River and its accompanying Valley are docile and friendly to
its inhabitants and spectators. The placid pools of captured water, held back from their
natural flow by huge, monolithic dams offer an entirely different experience of the
Tennessee River than those of its earlier days. These giants of “God’s Valley” allow easy
navigation over the once burdensome obstacles of the original river, another historical
dilemma conquered through the expertise of technology was the valley’s unpredictable
flooding. The constant flooding of the river, so disastrous to countless generations of
farmers but initially responsible for the valley’s fertility, no longer pose a problem to
valley residents. With the sinking of thousands of formerly dry acres along the
Tennessee Valley, the TVA regulated the unpredictable consequences that rainfall had on
water levels, ending the threat of floods. The TVA’s Tennessee River left an undeniable
legacy on the Tombigbee as its development in the 1930s and 40s blazing a trial for the
development of the Tenn-Tom in the 60s, 70s and 80s.111
A similar story of two rivers, the river of “legend” and “statistics,” holds true for
the Tombigbee River. Just like the Tennessee, the first river was the river of old; one
vanished into the realm of fable. In fact, Tombigbee is a name rarely used today, as the
river itself has been absorbed by the moniker Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway and the
Tombigbee-Black Warrior River System to the south. Smaller than the Tennessee, the
Tombigbee was a serpentine river that moved south from the northeast hills of
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Mississippi through the Black Belt Prairie of central Alabama and Mississippi. The
frequent flooding of adjacent flatlands and woodlands left a riverside edged by bluffs and
cane thickets. The upper part of the river, too shallow for navigation for most of the year,
swelled during the rainy winter months, allowing seasonal passage as far north as Cotton
Gin Port, Mississippi near modern day Amory, Mississippi. The headwaters of the
Tombigbee River flowing out of the hills of Northeast Mississippi were too sporadic,
tangled, and shallow to meet transportation needs. The populations on this stretch
utilized its waters for operating water mills and water plant machinery. The muddy
waters of the river often overflowed their banks and swept aside brush and debris creating
countless dangers along its length. These snags, coupled with sandbars and shallows,
made navigation a risky prospect. Yet, despite these less than desirable conditions, the
Tombigbee remained a free flowing river, one of the few left east of the Mississippi long
after the transformation of the Tennessee.112
Like Davidson’s “river of statistics” the second river drowning the Tombigbee of
old is the Tenn-Tom itself. The Corps’ layout of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway
divided it into three distinct sections: the River, Canal, and Divide Cut, each of which
called for a different criteria and means of construction in order to overcome the
geographical obstacles of the countryside. Each section demanded different
environmental considerations during the design and construction of the waterway.
Because of the mandates set out by the NEPA, the sections were engineered with a
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thought toward alleviating the harmful environmental impacts and each called for unique
and separate measures. As such, the waterway’s three sections grappled with their own
set of environmental shortcomings, such as spoil disposal, aquifer drawdown, water
quality, erosion, and sedimentation. At the same time that the engineers grappled with
the individual considerations of each section, they had to maintain a constant watch over
other larger environmental concerns that encompassed the project as a whole, including
the overall loss of wildlife habitat, impacts on endangered species, and the transfer of
water and organisms from two biologically distinct river systems. With their efforts,
engineers had to balance quantifiable impacts—those problems which were predictable
and evaluated for, such as spoil amount and acreage changed—with qualifiable ones—
those more intangible in nature, such as uncertainty of biodiversity consequences caused
from the mixing the waters of the two rivers separated progressing along distinct
biological paths for thousands of years and the extinction of wildlife species resulted
from this incorporation. In particular, the qualifiable terms by their very nature remained
largely unpredictable during construction and only time would tell what would happen.113
What remained important was that the Corps designed the waterway to look and
act as naturally as possible. They cultivated its image and groomed the surrounding
landscapes into an Arcadian paradise, which lessened the presence of their alterations to
the land. In essence, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway was like conducting three
projects in one and it took a tremendous amount of ingenuity for the engineers to balance
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the different criteria of each section into an economically feasible, yet environmentally
friendly project, but their achievement would pay dividends in drawing men and animals
to the project area.114
The southernmost part of the waterway, the River Section, so called because its
construction remained inside the original river’s boundaries, stretches for 149 miles and
included four lock and dams in order to circumnavigate a 117-foot elevation change.
Flowing through a countryside of flat alluvial river bottom land with small rolling hills
and bluffs geologically sculpted by centuries of floods, the old river, near its convergence
with the Black Warrior River, required maintenance and expansion in order to fit into the
project’s plans. For the individuals located along this stretch of the project, riverine life
played a significant role within their culture. It was this stretch of the Tombigbee that
steam powered paddle boats plied their trade and cotton exporters of the Black Belt
shipped their wares to coastal ports. In more recent times, inhabitants of this region
enjoyed the recreational benefits of fishing and pleasure boating. The Corps widened and
straightened the old river’s twisting path by dredging a channel three hundred feet wide
and nine-feet deep, into the existing Tombigbee River. In the course of dredging, the
River section excavated 84,279,000 cubic yards of dredge material, which took 9,068
areas of land to create disposal areas.115
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In older projects, the Corps cleared river banks of trees and foliage and the spoil
(excess earth created from dredging and excavation) was dumped in a continual line
along the banks of rivers. This created an ugly “scar” of lifeless land visible from the
water and any passing roads in project areas. There was little consideration for erosion,
seepage, or damage into adjacent wetlands. While this was a tactic utilized by both
public and private construction companies prior to 1970, under the environmental
mandates of NEPA, the Corps was forced to turn to different tactics. During the
development phase of the Tenn-Tom, the Corps adopted several changes to lessen the
adverse environmental impacts of its construction. First, the Corps limited its widening
and deepening to the bare minimal needed for proper navigation. Next, it utilized a
hydraulic dredge in a box cut design, which undercut the bank, allowing upper material to
slough down, creating a naturally sloped and stable bank, suitable to avoid erosion and
allow proper plant growth. Where possible, the Corps only cut along one bank, leaving
the other side in its natural state. Dredged material was pumped into preplanned disposal
sites for the good of the environment and then hidden from the view of any travelers on
the river and any roads within the area. At the same time, the Corps chose disposal sites
with environmental friendliness in mind. Three disposal sites utilized abandoned gravel
pits and three more were contained in old mines, which eliminated safety hazards and in
some ways improved environments already degraded by human consumption. Also, four
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additional sites used excavated material to create industrial sites suitable for regional
development needs.116
However, the bulk of dredge materials needed designated and prepared disposal
locations throughout the years of construction. The River Section, being composed of
river floodplain land consisting of bottomland hardwood forests, a prime location for
wildlife habitat, mandated careful consideration to lessen environmental damage to
surrounding areas. The largest concern plaguing the disposal of spoil was that these soils
typically were heavily leeched of valuable nutrients and of a higher acidic ph than typical
topsoil. This meant that the soil was unsuitable for growing plant life. Engineers
adopted a two-cell system where the first cell was a container for holding excavation
material and the second provided “sedimentation retention, turbidity control and water
quality protection.” In addition buffer zones of natural vegetation surrounded disposal
sites and provided three functions. First they created a transition zone between the
terrestrial disposal site and natural aquatic landscape. Second, it provided a seed source
for natural vegetation to eventually take root in disposal sites and third, it provided an
aesthetic screen, hiding the site from view. While traditional disposal of spoil related to
river system maintenance and construction damaged surrounding lands drastically, the
efforts along the Tenn-Tom River Section created an environment that within four to five
growing seasons was completely revegetated. In addition, during the transition years of
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the spoil sites returning to their natural state as hardwood forest, they offered wildlife a
different old field habitat, which appealed to a diversity of animals. So, despite
potentially negative environmental damages associated with spoil disposal, the River
Section created an atmosphere of helpful and inventive uses of materials. In an article in
Environmental Geology, Gerald McLindon remarked, “At this time, it is obvious that the
measures taken [in the River Section] have heightened biological production and
diversity. The operation has resulted in environmental protection and conservation that
will sustain the resources of the area.” 117
The middle section, called the Canal Section, is forty-six miles long, twelve-feet
deep and three hundred feet wide beginning just south of Amory, Mississippi and ending
north at Bay Springs Lake. Narrower, curvier, and shallower than its lower reaches,
populations along this stretch of the Tombigbee were a mixed lot, a combination of river
delta and hill country farmers. For the most part, riverine culture and economics was not
as large a feature of the people in this section. In an area filled with numerous rocky
springs, creeks, and streams, populations historically used water to power mills rather
than to ship exports. The headwaters of the Tombigbee River spawned from the hills in
the northern part of this section. Navigation along this part of the river was unpredictable
at best as only during the flood season of winter did commercial craft even attempt to sail
these shallow waters. The Corps created five locks and corresponding pools, overcoming
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a 140-foot elevation change and constructed the section by building a “Chain of lakes”
connected by a manmade canal. By adopting this concept, the Corps looked to enhance
the natural beauty of the environment by providing favorable terrain to fish and wildlife
as well as leaving the waterway’s appearance in a more “natural” state. The canal and
the “Chain of lakes” lay to the east of the Tombigbee River itself and this area remains
the only place where the old river survives for any considerable stretch. Paralleling
instead of overlaying the original snakelike course eased the Corps’ design and aesthetic
considerations and allowed the original river to keep its serpentine shape, but not its
original flow. However, the more easily built and navigable canal and “Chain of lakes”
required the purchase and flooding of nearly double the acreage of land predicted by the
initial designs.118
In 1985, Gerald McLindon declared that “most of this area was considered
excellent wildlife habitat” before construction began. This section changed the physical
landscape of 11,854 acres with 8,117 becoming lake pools, 2,524 encompassing a series
of levees, dikes, locks, and spillways, 898 for spoil disposal, and 315 for recreation areas.
Of this land, only 2,500 acres were used for agricultural purposes, the rest was composed
of bottomland hardwoods, other forestlands, and the occasional gravel pit. This section
required the removal of 47,951,000 cubic yards of excavation with a large portion being
used to construct the infrastructure needed for the “Chain of Lakes” system. With a
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desire to keep all parts of the waterway as aesthetically pleasing, while reducing impacts
on local environments, the Corps blended waterway structures into the landscape and
constructed a levee system along the west side of the navigation channel. In order to stop
erosion and ease the Corp’s efforts in care and maintenance of the levees system,
designers called for a “natural revegetation” of the banks were applicable. However, care
was taken to ensure levee integrity. This meant that the waterside of the levee would be
compose of grasses only, while the land side would consist of a transition from shrubs,
small trees, medium trees, to an unrestricted zone. This was to ensure that the roots of
plants would not undermine the structural integrity of the levee and cause erosion and the
possible collapse of the levee. Despite the term “natural revegetation,” it was
“anticipated that some control will be exercised over the types of plant species growing
on certain parts of the levee, in order to maintain an adequate ‘root-free zone.’” Overall,
the adoption of the “Chain of Lakes” concept over a “Perched” canal meant a minimizing
of environmental and aesthetic ramifications, as the majority of spoil was reused for
infrastructure purposes. The reduction in disposal sites and the promotion of proper land
use created a “good-quality” wildlife habitat area in this section, a slight reduction from
its excellent rating prior to construction.119
The Divide Section is northernmost section, and for visitors today undoubtedly
the most likely awe-inspiring. It is comprised of a thirty-nine mile long trench from the
twin pools of Bay Springs Lake to the south and Pickwick Lake on the Tennessee River

119

McLindon, p. 97-100.

116

to the north. The channel runs twelve feet deep with a span 280 feet wide. The deepest
cut on the waterway occurred near the town of Paden, Mississippi and is 175 feet deep
and fifteen-hundred feet wide. The Divide Cut was a tremendous undertaking, as the
average depth of the cut equaled around 50 feet in depth. Producing 150 million cubic
yards of spoil, the cut equaled one-half of the total accumulated during the waterway’s
construction. Engineers moved more earth from this section than was removed during
the entire construction of the Panama Canal. As one telling example of the amount of
earth moved from the Divide Cut, the spoil was enough to produce a two-lane highway
from the Earth to the moon. The major navigational purpose of the Divide cut was that it
linked the man-made lakes Bay Springs and Pickwick Lake; two Corps built lakes on the
same elevation level, easing navigation between the two water systems of the Tennessee
and Tombigbee Rivers. The only navigational feature in the Divide Section is Bay
Springs Lock and Dam. While typical locks along the Tenn-Tom have an average lift of
twenty-eight feet, Bay Springs Lock and Dam was a major exception with a lift of eightyfour feet. Bay Springs Lock and Dam was set in a 100-foot-high rock filled dam, 2,500
feet long. This earthwork created Bay Springs Lake which alone encompassed 6,700
acres of land. This lock completed the tiered stair-step approach that utilized ten locks
and dams to overcome a total elevation difference of 341 feet from one end of the
waterway to the other.120
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The design of the Divide Cut channel required innovated thinking from the
project’s engineers. In efforts to avoid erosion problems stemming from the slopes of the
cut, the Corps adopted an upside down pyramid approach. Then the tiered slopes of the
cut were seeded with vegetation, while the actual banks were covered with filter cloth
and lined with stones in order to combat turbulence caused by passing watercraft. The
contoured banks of the Divide Cut have a “back slope and lateral slopes to surfaced drop
ditches and piped systems to collect and deliver surface water to the pool in a controlled
manner. While this section is the most aesthetically unpleasing in natural appearances,
designers looked to create more “natural” landscapes away from the banks and into the
surrounding land.
During construction, the disposal of so much spoil in the Divide Cut became an
important point of contention between experts. While initial reactions from surveyors
saw the large number of disposal areas as having an adversely negative affect on the
surrounding countryside, an examination from a multidisciplinary team determined that
the quality of most of the surrounding land was already in poor condition to begin with.
Much of the land used in the disposal of Divide Cut spoil were those of previously logged
out forestlands, fallow fields, or poor soil quality pasture and croplands. A brief
historical sketch of region conducted by Dr. Harold A. Thomas of Harvard University
explained the land’s poor condition. Starting in the 1820s and 30s the region experienced
a rapid population growth. Most families settled in the Northeast Hills of Mississippi in
order to avoid the seasonal flooding and hordes of mosquitoes plaguing the bottomlands
to the south. With the soils found in the hill country marginal and being less fertile than
118

neighboring floodplain areas, farmers adopted a custom where land was cleared used to
the point of exhaustion. Then farmers would move to fresh land and repeat the process.
Land left behind by this practice quickly gullied and eroded under the heavy rainfall of
the region, pouring heavy sedimentation into creeks and rivers downstream. Unlike other
sections of the project area, the populations settling along the divide never experienced
any form of riverine culture in their day to day life. The only water resources in the
region were swamplands and small, fast flowing tributaries whose waters fed the creeks
and rivers located downstream.121
Because the land of the Divide Cut area was poor in environmental qualities,
placing excavated soils in the hollers and valleys adjacent to the waterway was not
damage to a pristine wildlife habitat, but a restoration and replacement of land lost
through decades of poor husbandry by the local people. Utilizing a “valley fill”
operation, engineers planned to create mounded areas of spoil disposal in neighboring
depressions and let natural erosion reform the land, which would “replicate undisturbed
hill country.” The next considerations for disposal sites were their “environmental
acceptability, capacity, average haul distance, and degree of difficulty for hauling
equipment,” as the area of highest quantities of spoil were the areas of the deepest cuts
and the most difficult terrain. Again, engineers designed disposal site with aesthetic
buffer zones in mind and hid disposal sites from the waterway and nearby roadways.122
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Unlike other areas where landownership was limited due to surrounding cities and
populations, the isolation of the Divide Cut section allowed the Corps to purchased large
tracts of land. This enabled them to retain ownership of numerous sites and enact longrange land management programs for the many disposal areas needed. With the
abundance of land required for disposal site, the Corps then turned these changed lands
into wildlife management areas, a mitigation procedure endorsed as means of replacing
lost wildlife habitats throughout the entire project area. The long-range goal of these
areas was the establishment of vegetation which supported a “superior” wildlife
management zone. In order to accomplish this goal, the land including disposal sites,
recreation areas, and the neighboring countryside was organized under one managing
authority, with a single mission of bettering wildlife habitats for all areas of the
waterway.123
It is important to note that during the design and construction of the TennesseeTombigbee Waterway the Corps engineered and cultivated the waters and land of the
project area into an environment geared toward both the needs of man and natural
wildlife as well. The transformations of the Tennessee and Tombigbee rivers and the
Corps’ environmental strategies on the Tenn-Tom played a crucial role in the rise of the
waterway’s recreational appeal, but it was only one part of the story. In the years after
the Tenn-Tom’s opening, these tactics changed and the Corps and developers stepped up
cultural resource management missions. While some recreational and educational
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facilities were included in the design and construction phase of the waterway, their
numbers increased steadily from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, as the Corps and
developers saw the need for additional facilities to meet the demands of the public and to
fulfill its newly appointed cultural resource management mission.
If environmental considerations conducted during the construction of the
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway was dictated by the passage of the NEPA, in the years
after its opening new considerations fell on equally revolutionary legislation, the Water
Resource Development Act of 1986 (WRDA-86). Enacted a year after the Tenn-Tom
opened in 1985, WRDA-86 reshaped not only the Tombigbee Valley and the Tenn-Tom
Waterway, but radically altered the ideologies and organization of the Mobile District of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. This act specified that the Corps had to develop
mitigation plans for destroyed wetlands as a project proceeded, instead of afterwards as in
the case of the Tenn-Tom. Additionally the WRDA-86 demanded changes in cost
sharing with the local state governments, forcing state agencies to pick up a higher share
of a project’s costs and maintenance. Then Congress forced the Corps to look at
mitigating the damages of past projects, demanding they replace lost and damaged lands
with new pristine ones in order to protect and preserve them for future generations.124
In the case of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, WRDA-86 mandated that
46,000 acres of wetland belonging to the Corps be set aside for fish and wildlife habitat
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due to the massive loss of hardwood bottomland habitat caused during the project’s
construction. In addition, Congress provided funding for the Tennessee-Tombigbee
Waterway Wetlands Mitigation, expanding the scope of the project’s acreage beyond its
initial lofty projections. Under WRDA-86 the Corps received authority to purchase an
additional 88,000 acres of bottomland hardwood forests in Mississippi and Alabama.
This additional land was to atone for similar woodlands lost during the construction of
the waterway, but ironically, not all of the land purchased was in the project area.
Initially receiving $66.2 million for purchasing the 88,000 acres for the Tenn-Tom
project, the Corps actually received $92 million for expenses after inflation.125
The purchase of these additional lands in the later 1980s provided many benefits
for the people of the region, as well as the many visitors exploring the richness of the
South’s history and resources. Wildlife biologist Jeff Magnum stated that the Corps
managed “over 87,000 acres of land not only to provide for wildlife mitigation, but also
to provide recreation for consumptive and non-consumptive users of wildlife. As a result
of this, many species of wildlife including game and non-game, as well as threatened or
endangered species have been benefited.” Belonging to the federal government, wildlife
mitigation lands were protected but open to public use. Hunters and sport fishermen in
particular enjoyed the benefit of increased accessibility to public lands in a region that
had been limited in this resource. These individuals quickly realized that the lands of the
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waterway offered an abundance of game animals and fish. Geared toward protecting and
preserving the environment, the Tenn-Tom Wildlife Project formed from a collection of
disciplines and created the Project Delivery Team. Consisting of biologists from the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service and from the respective state wildlife services, the Project
Delivery Team gathered a collection of experts including foresters, civil engineers,
architects, a hydraulic engineer, an attorney, a realty specialist, an archaeologist, and
resource managers and placed more than 150,000 acres of land under their management
and direction. This team became responsible for a wide-ranging number of activities
such as hunting programs, waterfowl impoundment, bird and wildlife management,
agricultural planting, wetland controls, and other aspects of forestry management.126
One important need that the team saw was handicap facilities and programs. With
this in mind, amenities for handicapped individuals were included at all campgrounds and
fishing stations were specifically designed to meet special needs. In addition, easy access
points to the water were installed in specified areas during the 1980s. One of the more
popular and wide-reaching programs associated with the Tenn-Tom were special hunts
designed specifically for handicapped individuals. By providing disabled individuals
with the facilities, supervision, and opportunities they did not have before, the popularity
of these hunts stretched to individuals outside the waterway’s immediate area. A former
manager of the waterway for the Corps remembered, “In 1988, we initiated special
hunting days in early deer and turkey season to give the immobilized handicapped a
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chance to hunt. Relatives and on-site biologists help the hunters in an area set aside near
Gainesville, Alabama.” The popularity of this program made it an annual event.127
The advantages of access to public lands went beyond those of hunters, fishers
and those in need of special amenities and programs. Once again, Jeff Magnum
explained the Corps strategy. He said, “Well we manage these areas to provide optimum
wildlife diversity and wildlife habitat. In doing so, we provide a lot of recreational
opportunity for users of these areas including hikers, bikers, birdwatchers, hunters,
fishermen, and just anybody else who enjoys the outdoors. This will leave us with a rich
legacy for future generations.”128
To ensure this legacy, the Corps built two environmental education centers, one
on Bay Springs Lake located between the Divide and Canal sections and the other at
Plymouth Bluff, near Columbus, Mississippi. Cabins, nature trails, gazebos, classrooms,
and eating facilities are maintained by an educational consortium of Mississippi
universities. Danny Hartley, Project Biologist for the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway,
explained their significance. He stated:
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An important part of the Tombigbee Project was the construction and
operation of two culture environmental centers. These areas are operated
by the local universities here in the area and they cater to a large group of
individuals, aiming from schoolchildren all the way to corporate
executives. Their broad goals are basically environmental, cultural, and
historical education. Their other goal is just to get people back to the area
to show them that large-scale civil works projects such as these can be
constructed and operated in an environmentally sensitive manner.129
Opening in 1986, the Plymouth Bluff Facility on Columbus Lake in Mississippi
was notable because it was located at a historic site that caused a relocation of the TennTom during construction. To avoid cutting directly through a bluff housing important
fossil records, the Corps altered the waterway’s route leaving the bluff and old river
untouched for a stretch. Maintained through the combined efforts of the Project
Management Team and the Mississippi University for Women, the facility joined with
the Nature Conservancy Program to preserve the ancient fossil bed and erected a $4.75
million facility stressing environmental awareness and education. Management and
maintenance are the direct responsibility of the university, a cost sharing feature dictated
by WRDA-86. Along with the cabins, conference center, open-air auditorium, and trails,
there are scenic views of the old Tombigbee River and the Plymouth Bluff
Paleontological site. The museum contains fossilized mollusks, foraminiferans, and
sharks’ teeth some 65-100 million years old. Educating the people of the region
incorporated a sense of “civic environmentalism” into the region, where state and federal
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agencies fostered environmental thought within local populations. Yet, environmental
awareness was not the only educational agenda for sponsors of the waterway.130
At Pickensville, Alabama, the Bevill Visitor Center, named after Alabama
Representative Tom Bevill, serves as a replica of an antebellum plantation house and
depicts the historical importance of navigation on inland waterways throughout the
Southeast. Behind the center is one of the region’s most popular National Historic
Landmarks—the U.S. Snagboat Montgomery. The retired “steam-powered sternwheeler”
is an 80-year old Corps of Engineers ship that cleared the waterways of the Southeast of
trees and other dangerous debris. Both the center and the snagboat offer visitors a look
into the history of the region, reminding visitors of the richness of southern history. In
northeastern Mississippi, near Fulton, the Corps constructed the Whitten Historical
Center, which displays the federal government’s influence in bringing economic
development to the region. The center focuses on the influence in Mississippi of such
diverse agencies as the Tennessee Valley Authority, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
and the National Park Service. Other centers are the Waterway Management Center
located in Columbus, Mississippi, which looks to the overall management of the
waterway and the Bay Springs Resource and Visitor Center which concentrates on
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recreational and natural resources on the Tenn-Tom. These resource centers are open to
the public and offer a wide range of benefits from educational programs to research
opportunities and leisure activities, as well as provide some additional jobs to the
region.131
The advantages of the Tenn-Tom stretched to more than the people of the region.
Other special projects involving close partnering between federal and state agencies were
targeted at the wildlife of the area. In an annual publication, Daniel E. Cimarosti stated
the waterway’s agenda. He said, “We have protected or enhanced habitat so that many
animals’ needs are satisfied not only for food but for breeding and escape. We
accomplish some of this by planting food plots, subjecting areas to prescribed burns,
planting trees, and placing nesting structures. With the help from the Mississippi
Department of Wildlife Canada geese, white-tailed deer, and turkey have been stocked in
areas conducive to their propagation.” In 1991, federal and state wildlife agencies
brokered a deal that would reintroduce endangered species back into the region.
Responding to a federal directive attempting to reintroduce bald eagles to Alabama and
Mississippi, the Project Management Team joined with the Sutton Avian Research Center
in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, to “place fledglings hatched in captivity into artificial nests in
an attempt to encourage the bald eagles to return to the area after they depart.” Hacking
is a term used for reintroducing a species into its natural environment. The Federal Eagle
Hacking Program erected towers on lands along the waterway and constructed holding
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cages that simulated natural nesting sites. In 1992, forty-six immature eagles were placed
in the towers at several points along the waterway and nearby lakes. After banding and a
thirteen week acclamation period, the birds were released into the wild. Within a year,
nearly a dozen banded pairs of eagles were nesting in the areas where they were released
and the bald eagle was successfully reintroduced back into the region.132
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the strategies of land and wildlife
“enhancement” employed by federal and state agencies imparted a park like feel to the
waterway and people began to associate a connection between the Tenn-Tom and leisure
activities. Another pastime gaining tremendous importance was camping. Prior to the
construction of the waterway, the region had very few facilities and sites to meet
outdoorsmen needs. The Tenn-Tom Waterway mitigation efforts created some forty
recreational areas, most of which permitted overnight camping. Along with camping
opportunities, the Tenn-Tom also created several beaches, although none were in the
original plans for the waterway. The advantages of these new campgrounds to
communities were that they provided locals and outsiders a chance not only to enjoy the
outdoors, but it also encouraged spending in the communities in the vicinity. One
newspaper reported, “Campgrounds such as the one at Blue Bluff often become known
nationwide and attract ‘snowbirds’ or retirees who spend the winter months in Florida
and other Sunbelt states, stopping at campgrounds along the way.” Seeing the benefits of
132

McClure IV and Connell Sr., p. 567; Daniel E. Cimarosti, “Tenn-Tom Today,” [unknown
publication and date, likely 1986], clipping located in Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Scrapbook 19861992, Plymouth Bluff Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Columbus, Mississippi; Megan Pratt,
“Experiment Would Put Eagles On Tenn-Tom,” (Columbus: MS) The Commercial Dispatch, 24 March
1991.

128

having campgrounds in their communities and cashing in on transit recreational traffic,
business leaders quickly began trying to get in on a piece of the action and new facilities
became big news in small towns. Corps ranger, LuAnn Lackey summed up their appeal
to rural communities saying, “The facilities are there for the community to use, and it will
reap the economic benefits. Campers will naturally buy food and gas from the town
closest by.” This meant that communities were interested in gaining access to
recreational facilities, as well as linking their profits to the economics of the region.133
The environmental strategies and tactics employed during construction and the
years after WRDA-86 had transformed the land. They also had a side effect. They began
to change the way local people began to envision the waterway’s promise. From the start
it promised economic salvation and jobs. But on a deeper level it promised a lot more.
Proponents not only saw it providing jobs, but also as a way of improving the quality of
life for people in an economically distressed part of the country. The many recreational
and educational facilities provided locals with new cultural resources. In part, this was to
mitigate those lost during construction. However, without the emphasis created by
federal legislation and funding, the region had little hope of developing them the TennTom. The advantages of the environmental measures turned largely into positive impacts
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on the people and wildlife of the region and development geared toward intertwining
industrial and recreational pursuits.134
In 1990, estimates placed the number of visitors to the recreational facilities to be
over seven million people. This was remarkable because many of the planned facilities
were still on the drawing board on in the process of construction. The Corps, regional
developers, and local business leaders began to see the potential recreational traffic had
on the growth of the economic future of the region. One area of recreational economic
importance was the tremendous amount of civilian owned boat traffic on the waterway.
From the very first days of operation, engineers noted that pleasure boats accounted for a
large percentage of waterway traffic. For example, in 1985, 433 commercial boats
passed through the Aberdeen Lock of the Tenn-Tom. Dwarfing this number was the
1,280 pleasure boats plying the same waters and utilizing the same lock. While part of
the heavy traffic was attributable to the newness of the waterway, in the years to come,
day pleasure craft still made up the majority of traffic on the Tenn-Tom’s channels and
lakes. The byproduct of the waterway’s layout and the environmental considerations
utilized in its construction combined with the strategies, programs, and facilities adopted
after its opening, created a haven for recreational visitors. Taking advantage of the wide
canals and lake impoundments created behind five dams, boaters flocked to the waterway
to enjoy its many recreational opportunities. Largely overlooked for its potential
economic benefits to the people of Mississippi and Alabama, the waterway’s recreational
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value was virtually untapped in its earliest days and remained another slow developing
economic resource.135
In 1986, Amory Mayor, Thomas Griffith admitted to a local newspaper, “The
travel industry is something we’re in our infancy in. There are a lot of places doing a lot
with what they’ve got. The Tenn-Tom is a tremendous attraction. We need to survey our
assets. We may be surprised at what we’ve got that can be an attraction.” Developers
were just beginning to see a way in which their communities could harness the
environmental appeal of the Tenn-Tom and promote recreation as a means of profit.
Griffith continued, “We’re interested in tourism and recreational development up and
down the waterway. For instance, we’re interested in talking to hotel people. Hotels are
something we’d like to see along the Waterway.” The draw of recreation and tourism
was a proven commodity of the South. In 1985, the state of Mississippi invested $1.5
million dollars in tourism which brought in an estimated profit of one billion dollars in
revenue. That same year, Alabama budgeted $3.1 million for tourism which resulted in a
profit of $3.6 billion.136
In the years leading up to the waterway’s opening, the Corps and regional
developers had concentrated some of their efforts on the enrichment of cultural resources
for local people such as the campgrounds, boat ramps, and environmental education
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centers, but largely ignored the economic potential of such sites. In addition, like
industries looking for adequate facilities, watercraft found amenities missing for their
needs. As the Tenn-Tom became a haven for pleasure boaters, water-skiers, and bass
anglers, instead of a busy barge canal lined with bustling ports and industries, developers
saw another chance at fulfilling the promise of economic salvation. As the pleasure
seekers traveled through a landscape described as “more park-like than industrial,” they
spent money along the way. Large yachts began to outnumber the barges passing through
the waterway’s locks and dams during the spring and fall months and towns along the
waterway’s length began scrapping their plans for industrial ports in an effort to convert
their investments into “marinas and resort complexes.”137
In fact, the heavy recreational traffic began to worry some Corps officials. Within
the first couple of years of operation, the Operations and Maintenance Chief of the
Corps’ Mobile District, Freddy Jones stated, “This volume makes for significant wearand-tear on the lock and its equipment.” The Corps was concerned over the number of
smaller recreational craft using the locks to reach certain areas of the waterway. In 1986,
the Corps began utilizing brochures and local newspapers to educate locals about proper
uses and reduce the number of recreational lockages. Jones continued, “On weekends, it
seems like we’re working around the clock with pleasure boats. So we’re going to be
putting out some educational material on how the pleasure boater can help us operate the
locks efficiently.” The Corps encouraged boaters to make longer trips once through a
lock or travel to alternative boat ramps instead of using the locks. “We would encourage
137
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pleasure craft to make longer trips once they lock through,” he said. Jones also expressed
a concern about the affects heavy recreational traffic would have on commercial boats
using the waterway. He said, “We also need to get the word out on the logistics of
including this heavy recreational traffic in what we hope and think will be an increasing
commercial volume. We are also publishing a pamphlet explaining navigation rules and
the cooperation needed between recreational boaters and industrial users.” Recreational
traffic was here to stay and the Corps had to adjust its strategies in dealing with boat
traffic of all sorts.138
However, this unexpected influx of traffic flowed with another set of problems.
Just like their failures to develop commercial ports and facilities, communities along the
waterway failed to provide for pleasure crafts as well. In 1986, Waldon stressed an area
of concern for the Development Authority. That year, the Tenn-Tom had only “three
marinas on the waterway.” Waldon felt that this created an experience where “a lot of
these people end up tying up to a tree” in order to stop for the night and left travelers
nowhere to pick up supplies from the communities dotted along the waterway. Lack of
facilities stretched beyond just places for boats to tie up. Boat retailers, sporting good
supplies, dry dock, and repair shops were all missing for those interested or in need of
there services. The people of Mississippi and Alabama were missing potential profits
from the transit pleasure-seeking visitors. Addressing a large yacht plying the waters of
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the Tenn-Tom, Waldon explained to a newspaper, “If they have money to spend on a
boat like that, they have money to spend here.” While the lack of economic facilities
geared toward recreation were slowing, the communities’ efforts to capitalize on
recreational dollars remained reason for optimism. Seeing a source of potential profit
passing by untapped, Waldon declared, “Until we get a facility to let them spend their
money, we aren’t getting the benefits.” This reminded developers and business leaders of
the retarded industrial efforts to capitalize the economic benefits of the Tenn-Tom,
reminding them that the Tenn-Tom remained a work in progress, however if they built
them, people and dollars would come.139
Although pleasure boaters will never carry the financial burden of the Tenn-Tom,
they do offer an extra source of revenue for the impoverished communities along its
corridor. Unlike their commercial counterparts, pleasure boaters do not pay federal fuel
surcharges that are supposed to cover construction and operation costs of inland
waterways. However, they are becoming an increasingly poignant factor in what many
local business leaders imagine as “their best hope for some economic benefit from the
long-awaited canal.” Even in 1985, Mayor Griffith of Amory held a somewhat fortuitous
outlook toward the Tenn-Tom’s recreational aspect. Commenting on the emerging and
unexpected benefits of recreation Griffith supplied, “Ten years ago, bass fishing was not
anything like it is today. There’s no end to what it’s going to do.” For the expectations

139

Petersen, p. A9.

134

of the people of Mississippi, there is no telling what the future would foretell for them
and the Tenn-Tom.140
Table 3
Total Economic Impact of Recreation by 1991.141
Direct

Indirect

Induced

Total

$22,970,00
0

$11,590,000

$63,720,000

$98,280,000

1,427

451

3,012

4,890

$43,180,00
0

$21,800,000

$119,800,00
0

$184,780,000

2,682

849

5,662

9,193

Local
Compensation

Jobs
National
Compensation

Jobs

Despite its attempts to remain dedicated to its commercial roots, the Tenn-Tom
became a paradise for “yachties.” Cruising downstream in the autumn and upstream in
the spring, recreational boaters describe the waterway as “more scenic and less
troublesome than the busy Mississippi River.” The costly environmental mitigation
tactics the Corps adopted during the construction of the project turned out to benefit the
economies of locals throughout the region. The environmental appeal of the Tenn-Tom
helped stimulate economics, instead of hampering it. By 1991, recreational spending
totaled $98,280,000 dollars and created 4,890 jobs [see Table 3]. Turning their attention
140
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on this new form of economic gain for the people of Mississippi and Alabama, Don
Waldon and the TTWDA stated, “The waterway has captured practically all the transit
pleasure boating” through the South.142
In 1994, these thoughts were confirmed in the economic study of the Tenn-Tom’s
financial impact [see Table 4]. A poll from the local recreation areas showed that in
seven years visitor spending contributed $89,741,230 to local economies and
$168,720,870 to the nation overall. By 2000, the number of recreational dollars coming
into the region and nation as a result of the Tenn-Tom equaled $200 million each year. In
addition, that same year reported that nearly 2,000 large pleasure crafts travel its waters
annually. In fact, tourism and recreation remains one of the fastest growing sections of
the Tenn-Tom’s promise.
The transformation of the land facilitated the change in the outlook of its
economics. The tactics employed in each section carefully sculpted the Tenn-Tom
aesthetic qualities into a park-like setting. But that was only one part of the story.
Agencies combined tactics under cultural resource management creating additional
facilities and programs to offer people and animals added benefits. Together, the
strategies adopted, changed the environmental character of the land in Northeast
Mississippi and Western Alabama both during and after construction of the TennesseeTombigbee Waterway. At the same time, they changed the very culture of the region by
improving its quality of life. From the way people recreationally utilized its waters to the
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educational programs sponsored by its supporters, the environment of the Tenn-Tom was
having profound effects on the way people interpreted its promise.

Table 4
Spending Attributed to Recreation in 1991.143
Visits
Dayuse
Trip
Dayuse
Durable
Camper
Trip
Camper
Durable
Total

143

Spending/per
visit
21.50

2,414,623

%
local

$ Spending
Total
51,914,395

39,385,374

87,523,052

4,380,824

7,065,845

4,443,516

22,217,578

89,741,230

168,720,870

80
47.44

1,844,921

45
82.57

85,574

62
259.63

85,574

$ Spending
Local
41,531,516
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

At its very heart, the story of the Tennessee-Tombigee Waterway is a tale about
two rivers and the building of a promise. For centuries, dreamers envisioned constructing
a canal to link the two rivers opening a shorter alternative to the Gulf Coast to much of
the hinterland of America. “Land enhancement” was the banner that the Corps carried in
justifying their changes to the land. The Corps promised to resurrect in the place of the
old Tombigbee River a modern water system composed of interconnecting lakes, canals,
locks, and dams that would link the traditionally closed markets areas of Northeast
Mississippi and Western Alabama to a national water system economy, spurring new
growth in trade and industry. That was the foundation of the waterway’s promise.
After the Tenn-Tom’s construction began in 1971, the Corps adapted its plans in
order to make the proper environmental adjustments to protect natural and cultural
resources. While environmental measures increased the waterway’s costs and prolonged
construction, they ensured the Tenn-Tom was built as environmentally friendly as
possible. While economic progress and the environment clashed in the beginning, the
years after the opening of the Tenn-Tom hinted at a different outcome, one that shows
these forces working in tandem to salvage and fulfill the waterway’s promise.
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Constructed memories and recollections of people speak volumes into the popular
conceptions (or in some cases misconceptions) that define the lasting legacy of events.
Most Alabamians and Mississippians if asked about the lasting affects of the TennesseeTombigbee Waterway would answer in one of two ways. The first group would speak of
the project’s economic shortcomings. They would tell how the waterway’s promise of
new jobs never lived up to its hype; how it failed to meet the region’s economic
expectations. These residents still recall the turbulent years of its construction—19711985—but seem to fail to notice the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway’s influences on the
industrial growth of the South in the years after its completion. Instead of potential or
industrial development, most memories appear clouded by the disappointments and
frustrations community developers experienced during the early years of Tenn-Tom’s
operation, 1985-1995. Locals largely view these efforts as a failure to transform the
economies of Northeast Mississippi and Western Alabama. It seemed waterway’s
expectations spawned a sense of resentment within local populations who believed in a
promise too large to achieve.
The second group would offer a different interpretation and turn their
recollections away from economics entirely. They would focus on the waterway’s more
Arcadian resources. For millions of visitors flocking to the shores and waters of the
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, a plethora of recreational activities abound. From
beaches to boat ramps, man-made lakes and campgrounds, wildlife management areas
and nature trails, the scenic and natural beauty of the Tenn-Tom’s environment spoke of
other benefits to the area’s inhabitants and visitors alike. It is easily agued that as much
139

as the project appeared to have failed to transform the economic environment of the
region, it did radically reshape some aspects of the cultural landscape of Western
Alabama and Northeast Mississippi. The project altered native land and in the process
created new ecosystems and cultural resources, opening a formerly closed section of
America to the wider world around it. At the same time that people enjoyed the new
aquatic benefits of the waterway, wildlife was protected and cared for through mitigation
efforts. In the end, a recreational and wildlife heaven for man and animals was spawned.
Despite the popular conceptions of most people, boosters like the TTWDA would
argue that the waterway has indeed lived up to its promise. All that was needed was a
period of maturation. Within the first years of operation, Don Waldon stated, “The
state’s leading newspapers, if concerned about the state’s future, can provide an
invaluable service in promoting a more positive image for Mississippi instead of shooting
us in the foot as in the case of the Tenn-Tom.” Cohesiveness and cooperation was what
local people needed and development groups like the TTWDA would remain in operation
to uphold the Tenn-Tom’s promise. In 1997, Rubye Del Harden, general manager of
Northeast Mississippi Community Newspapers spoke of the positive aspects of the TennTom. She said, “The Tenn-Tom has helped induce some $2.5 billion dollars of new and
expanded industrial development in the waterway corridor since 1988.” She also went on
to tell how recreational visitors contribute “nearly $170 million to the economy because
of the additional economic spending each year.” The waterway was supplying economic
change, but it had a long way to go if it was to change its tarnished image. In the early
1990s, Don Waldon predicted, “It will be used, but you just have to be patient.
140

Analyzing the costs is based on 50 years of operation.” Agreeing with Waldon’s stance
was Alabama Representative, Tom Bevill, who firmly remained behind his support of the
project. He stated, “It’s there, and it’s going to stay there. I think it’s a good
investment.”144
Transformations to the land of the Tombigbee Valley did not start or end with the
Tenn-Tom, but ultimately these alterations provided a wellspring of opportunities for its
many people and offered the local populations some of the social uplifting they so
desperately needed. In the early 1990s people began to look at the Tenn-Tom differently.
A local newspaper expressed the lack of “lamentations” by people within the waterway
corridor in regards to the small amount of tonnage flowing through the areas locks.
Instead, individuals looked at other benefits. “It’s great for water-skiing,” commented
one local, Scott Thompson. To people not directly tied to the economics of the TennTom, talk centered on its great recreational appeal, including skiing, hunting, camping,
and fishing opportunities.145
Expressing these same feelings a few years earlier in 1988 was James Chatham
of Midway Marina in Fulton, Mississippi. During the same year that severe drought
caused the Ten-Tom to experience a boom in barge traffic, a local newspaper questioned
Chatham whether he felt the increase would affect noncommercial boaters. Asked
144
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whether he concerned or not about the increased traffic, Chatham stated that he did not
“think the situation [was] anything pleasure boaters need to be alarmed about.” He added
that he believed “most of the commercial traffic will return to the Mississippi when water
levels rise” back up. This was a truly ironic statement considering why the Tenn-Tom
was built for in the first place. Still, locals derived what benefits they could from the
waterway and recreational boating became high on their list.146
In fact, throughout the 1980s and 1990s recreational concerns such as boating
safety issues and drowning were as commonly reported in local newspapers as the
economic gains of the Tenn-Tom. Local and federal efforts in instituting safety programs
also increased within recreational areas. When the waterway opened in 1985, the
waterway averaged sixteen water-related fatalities each year. By 1995, this average had
dropped to just one a year after the manned recreational areas were completed. One of
the educational points emphasized along the Tenn-Tom was public safety, especially with
regard to using life vests and mixing alcohol with recreational activities. In 1997, as
recreational areas continued to grow, and user fees collected by the Corps at recreational
facilities totaled more than $700,000. Despite the fact that the waterway flowed through
some of the most economically depressed and rural areas of the South and did not have
any major urban centers from which to draw visitors, it averaged some 3.1 million
visitors a year throughout the 1990s. By 1998, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway
ranked fifth in user fees earned among all Corps projects nationwide. But despite the

146

Petersen, p. A1; Marie Harmon, “Tennessee-Tombigbee Facing Jam: Waterway’s Pleasure
Boaters Must Wait for Commercial Traffic” The Commercial Appeal (Memphis, TN), June 28, 1988, p.1

142

gain of jobs and recreation opportunities, the people of the region still suffered from
limited economic opportunities.147
In 1989, Amory business owner Tommy Swann remarked, “When they were
building this thing [the Tenn-Tom] I just thought this tree [one located outside his
business] would be loaded with money, and all I’d have to do is pick it.’” In reality, little
economic change occurred in most of the poor rural communities during the first five
years of waterway operation. Merchants throughout the region saw it as a
disappointment. Swann continued, “The waterway came with promises of prosperity, but
now that the project has become a reality, the promises have proven as empty as an old
mussel shell.” The glowing future of the waterway’s promise and the people’s hopes for
the future of the next generation remained in question. “All of my children had to leave
Amory to get a decent job, whereas I had hoped something would happen with a plant or
something where they could work here,” stated Swann, who spent most of his life in
anticipation of the Tenn-Tom. “We have people still leaving even after it was built. That
hasn’t changed at all,” he finished. Newspapers reported that if the waterway was the
states economic hope, “the state’s future looks bleak”. As bleak as economic
opportunities looked in rural Mississippi counties, some of the ones located Western
Alabama—which were supposed to benefit the most economically from the waterway—
actually fell further behind the rest of their state since construction on the project began.
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The gap between their employment rates and the statewide figure widened significantly
since the 1970s. Leon Styes a small business owner in Epes, Alabama stated, “It hasn’t
done nothing for us in this little town. I’m pretty bitter. We need some money here—
everybody’s on food stamps.” Gene Sullivan, an economist with the Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta explained, “You’re not likely to see companies want to move large
numbers of workers where they have questions about the schools and the library.” 148
Also in 1989, an Aliceville, AL, newspaper wrote, “It’s hard to find any jobs in
the self-proclaimed ‘Hot Spot of the Tenn-Tom.’ The average jobless rate in 1986 was
10.2 percent at a time when Alabama averaged 7.2 percent unemployment. But even
these figures understate the problems in Aliceville, since most of the city’s young people
leave the area to find work.” The loss of future generations to out migration and the
death of rural communities remained a concern of local people. Ecleave Hodges, the
high school guidance councilor remarked, “The job opportunities are very, very bleak.
Most of our students, especially the productive ones, leave the county. Quite a few of the
others go on welfare.” In 1989, Hodges claimed that one fifth of the previous year’s
senior class enlisted in military service, as a way out of their economic plight of the
region. In Western Alabama, estimates predicted that 86% of all youths leave the
counties of their birth.149
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That same year, Jan Sawyer, a lock operator, stated, “It just hasn’t been the
overnight success that a lot of people thought it would be. I really think we’re getting
there. It’s just taken a lot longer than a lot of people thought it would. “ Tim Parker,
president of Parker Towing Company in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, said, “The ports, the
docks, the rail spurs, those three things are still being added. Each time you add those
facilities, they make the Tenn-Tom much more competitive. It (gives) shippers and
receivers…options they haven’t had before.”150
The same debate swirled around the recreational aspects of the Tenn-Tom as well.
Commenting on the estimated six million recreational visitors attracted to the Tenn-Tom
during 1989, Don Waldon stated, “What makes that really phenomenal is we haven’t
finished building our recreational facilities.” Beenie Brown a grocery store owner said,
“There’s no limit to what you’ll spend when you’re going fishing. You might budget, but
there’s no limit to what you’ll spend.” As for other benefits, such as to the youth of the
region, Louise Monahean stated, “Amory didn’t have much for young people to do
before—just a theatre and a roller rink. They really enjoy the fishing and boating.” In
addition to enjoying the waterway’s recreational activities, local communities
incorporated the waterway into the customs of the region. The most important of these
was Christmas on the Tenn-Tom. Residents and visitors created an annual flotilla,
complete with decorations and lights to celebrate the holiday season. In 1989, the future
of the waterway was still in question, but as one local paper editorialized: “It may not be
150
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what they were promised, but the residents along the shores, used to receiving little, will
take what they can get.” While it would be easy to place local populations as victims of
this story—suffering from the same economic stagnation of previous generations—the
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway should not be the villain of the narrative. Suffering
from a promise too hefty for TTWDA and local business leaders to uphold, the
waterway’s history is one of hardships, shortcomings, and promise. One project no
matter how large cannot salvage the economic future of a region, suffering from the same
historical inadequacies of its past—poor education, inadequate transportation
infrastructures, and myriad social and racial issues, but it can help the process of
change.151
In 2000, the TTWDA produced a booklet claiming “the construction of the
waterway has created upwards of 50,000 new jobs, transforming this formerly
impoverished region into one that is anticipating continued progress and prosperity in
coming years. Companies including Boeing, Weyerhaeuser, Kerr McGee, Kimberly
Clarke, and Corus Steel have all located facilities in the corridor—thanks to the
advantages offered by the Tenn-Tom.” The maturation of the waterway seemed to be
aiding the fulfillment of its promise. In 2006, a booklet produce by the South Atlantic
Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers stated, “Lakeside recreation though it may
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be considered a luxury by some, is also a major economic force in the region.” It seemed
industrial and recreational growth was still coming to the Tenn-Tom region.152
Together, the intertwining of the economics and the environment of the
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway offered a new interpretation and fulfillment of its
promise. They formed a complimentary path for the future of the region. At the same
time it gave a gentle reminder or perhaps a warning against building expectations too
high and the limitations of people and progress. Perhaps, it also shows an example how
modern water navigational systems should be built, operated, and maintained in the new
environmentally conscious age. Stretching beyond its limited scope of jobs or its
questionable economic aspects are its created landscapes. By touching peoples lives on a
personal level, one in which people can return to land taken from them during
construction, , albeit for different reasons, the Tenn-Tom began appealing to a broader
base of people and actually sparked local interests, a type of grassroots recreational
movement. By enjoying the waterway through various leisure activities, local people
shed their image as victims to a failed promise and found benefits where they could.
Recreation began to make subtle, but significant changes on the region’s culture. While
there is no real villain in this story, not the Tenn-Tom nor the regional development
groups. Not even the boosters or politicians who built the promise too high. There is one
place blame can be laid. That is at the feet of progress, or at least the ideals fostered by
it. All the individuals contributing to the waterway’s construction and development and

152

Rob Holland, “Southeastern Drought Tests Water Managers,” Spectrum (U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, South: Atlantic Division 2006), vol. 3. no. 1, p. 19.

147

the building of its promise did what they had to do to uphold the region’s march toward
industrial advancement.
There in lies the fundamental problem of the project. Critics looked only at gains
in industry as a means of judging the waterway’s success. They failed to recognize the
other gains that the Tenn-Tom brought to people’s lives. Water, recreational activities,
and opportunities that they did not have before, all offer counter claims to the idea of
region’s failure to advance. Whether the waterway should have been built is no longer
the question. What remains is how it developed? The one legacy of the Tenn-Tom that
perhaps, matters the most is its unique combination of economics and environment. The
waterway has proven that man and nature can work hand in hand to the benefit of both.
In the process of one benefiting the other, both galvanized into a new promise, where the
environment (through recreation) and economics (by industrialization) offer the region a
new future. In the end, time will hold the final verdict on the Tennessee-Tombigbee
Waterway, but it reminds us, that for progress, there is always a price we all must pay.
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